Overall, it was a successful summit for President Macron. However, caution is warranted regarding the 2026 G7’s lasting legacy, as the unpredictability of the U.S. president could affect the durability of commitments made.

Hegseth’s call at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue for “less Shangri-La, more ships, more subs” and praising some Southeast Asian countries notwithstanding, ultimately, where choices have to be made, Southeast Asian political elites controlling the state coffers would be more sensitive to election cycles and hence prioritize socioeconomic well-being over substantially increasing and sustaining defense investment.

President Lai Ching-te delivered his second-anniversary address at the Presidential Office on May 20, 2026. In this speech, he highlighted three primary focus areas: safeguarding Taiwan’s democratic and free way of life, maintaining the status quo of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and developing the economy to build a Taiwan that is more resilient, competitive, and supportive of its people.

In May 2026, President Trump agreed to Xi Jinping’s proposal to build a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” between the U.S. and China on the basis of fairness and reciprocity.

Washington is unlikely to cut a big deal with Beijing at the expense of its friends and allies – much less enter into a “G-2” – for the foreseeable future. The summit is over. Time to return to the work of countering the PRC’s narrative warfare.

The current Babiš line is less a correction of the Fiala years than an attempt to revise their political meaning. The new government’s basic narrative is simple: Fiala tilted too far toward Taiwan, neglected China, and harmed Czech economic interests in the process. It is an argument that is easy to communicate. It just does not fit the facts very well.

On the evening of April 21, 2026, Taiwan’s Presidential Office announced the abrupt cancellation of President Lai Ching-te’s scheduled visit to Eswatini. The reason was not a security threat or a scheduling conflict. It was the weaponization of airspace in light of China’s recent intensified tactics in deploying warfare to adversely impact Taiwan’s international space.

Taiwan’s unmanned vehicle development is moving rapidly. If these efforts can be scaled and expanded to include more international partners at full speed, Taiwan will be able to wield another formidable counterpart to its Silicon Shield.

A lesson from the Eswatini incident may be Taiwan’s resilience under such pressure, one that may win it more substantive, albeit often informal, diplomatic ties.