On July 24, Member of Knesset (MK) Boaz Toporovsky initiated a statement, according to which “the systematic exclusion of Taiwan from international forums is unjustified and internationally irresponsible.” The statement provoked sharp criticism from the spokesman of the Chinese Embassy in Israel, who wondered “in what direction certain MKs intend to steer China-Israel relations.”

Despite the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s recent losses in both the Upper House and the Lower House of the National Diet, it is possible that Shigeru Ishiba will continue as prime minister of Japan. Furthermore, under the current schedule, there is no plan to hold the election of both the Upper House and the Lower House of the National Diet over the next three years.

The expiration of the U.S. reciprocal tariff grace period thrusts Taiwan into a complex environment defined by transactional diplomacy, strategic uncertainty, and economic vulnerability. Yet it also presents an opportunity to recalibrate Taiwan’s economic strategy.

On July 20 Japan held the 27th House of Councillors election. The ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito secured a combined total of 47 seats. Including the 75 uncontested seats, the coalition’s total after the election stands at 122 seats. This marks a decrease of 19 seats compared to the pre-election composition and falls short of the 125-seat majority required in the House of Councillors.

The result of the 2025 recall was neither the root cause of Taiwan’s political turbulence nor a cure. What it did, through a procedurally complex democratic exercise, was focus attention, at home and abroad, on the open wounds in Taiwan’s democracy: the ties between local power brokers and China, the rise of populism, and external threats from Beijing — all of which endanger the foundations of both sovereignty and democracy.

Russia has been making statements about revival of the Russia–India–China trilateral mechanism recently. Moscow’s reluctance to end the war with Ukraine could further weaken Russia and fundamentally change the internal equations in the RIC in which Russia could be the weakest link and China the strongest.

U.S. seeks peace and stability, but the demonstration of its military capabilities in Iran serves as a stark reminder that it retains the ability to shape outcomes should adversaries attempt to break the status quo.

Canadian Prime Minister Carney provided clear indications in a pre-election debate by arguing that Canada’s biggest security threat is China. He afterwards explained that China is a geopolitical threat due to its support of Russia’s war against Ukraine and threats to Taiwan.

President Lee inherits a polarized diplomatic landscape. His predecessors pursued divergent paths: Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) sought a balancing act between the U.S. and China while facing setbacks in Seoul–Tokyo relations, whereas Yoon Suk-yeol (2022-2025) aligned closely with the U.S. and Japan. In contrast, Lee has signaled a shift toward pragmatic diplomacy, prioritizing national interest over ideological alignment.

The new President of South Korea, Lee Jae-myung, officially assumed the presidency on June 4. Currently, South Korea is facing a collapse of political trust, social confrontation, torn labour relations, and economic slowdown domestically, while externally it has to deal with complex international economic, trade, and security restructuring issues.