The outcomes of the 2025 U.S.-Australia summit demonstrate that both sides intend to deepen their alliance on both economic and security levels in order to jointly counter the strategic challenges posed by China.

Foreign trade negotiators have been struggling to find out what they should offer to get a trade deal with President Trump and possible tariff reductions on their country’s exports. At a minimum, addressing the Trump administration’s concerns over the growing goods traded deficit the U.S. has with countries like Taiwan, and the tariff and non-tariff barriers other countries have on U.S. exports as well, is just the start.

The most important task for the CCP’s 4th Plenum was to approve the outline of the new five-year plan. Another issue of concern has been the necessary personnel changes to fill the holes left by Xi Jinping’s high-profile purges of the PLA. In this historical moment, Xi’s CCP has chosen to focus on improving China itself while relying on a model that, in Beijing’s eyes, has brought great success. The next five-year step towards the 2035 socialist modernization goal is made with anxious confidence.

In the National Day address, President Lai made only brief reference to cross-Strait relations, merely urging Beijing not to distort UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 or historical documents from World War II, reaffirming that Taiwan is not part of China. At the same time, President Lai devoted considerable attention to the direction of military preparedness and defense building. The overall message of the address was to demonstrate Taiwan’s determination for self-defense.

Sanae Takaichi’s victory in the Liberal Democratic Party presidential election in early October 2025 represented a dramatic shift in Japanese politics, with the politician becoming the first female party leader in 70 years. Takaichi, a strong conservative who models herself after the “Iron Lady,” Margaret Thatcher, now stands on the verge of becoming Japan’s first female prime minister.

The Tianjin Summit underscored that the SCO is no longer an organization that can be dismissed as peripheral. It has consolidated its identity as a platform for multipolarity, Eurasian connectivity, and Global South representation.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is about much more than just capturing a few regions of Ukraine. Rather, all this is about Russia and China’s efforts to undermine the liberal democratic world order and construct a new one divided by spheres of influence, where Eastern Europe and Eurasia are under Russian domination while the Indo-Pacific comes under China’s sway.

Another major signal the parade has sent to the international community, and especially to the West, that Beijing is more willing and able to make use of its own expanding network of friends and supporters, through bilateral diplomacy but also via organizations like the SCO and the recently expanded BRICS-plus grouping, to cement China as a strategic hub and an opposing pole.

These are tough times for the U.S.-India strategic partnership. Over the last few months, President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have sparred over various issues, including U.S. reciprocal tariffs (currently at 25%), U.S. sanctions for India’s continued import of discounted Russian oil (another 25%), and an apparent reset in U.S.-Pakistan ties. Recent disagreements have sunk Washington and New Delhi’s relations to the lowest point since 1998.