Although the four consecutive Global South presidencies carry diplomatic significance, it did not alter the fundamental reality that influence within the G20 remains uneven. Experts believe that despite the symbolism of four Global South countries having held the G20 presidency, they continue to have merely a “seat at the table,” which is realistically more ceremonial than substantive when major powers choose not to engage.

Many supporters expect KMT to perform strongly in the 2026 local elections and eventually regain power in 2028. Against this backdrop, whether Cheng can lead a party widely perceived as “outdated” into a new era, or whether her rhetoric — arguably more pro-China than that of the typical KMT politician — will ultimately backfire, has become a key question.

The 2025 edition of the end of year summit season in Southeast Asia concluded largely without mishap. U.S. President Donald Trump seemed to take no issue with the meeting in Malaysia, even appearing to enjoy the pomp and circumstance his Malaysian hosts prepared. Tense U.S.China relations did not overshadow the summitry.

Taiwan’s military and political leaders must reframe investments around survivability and interoperability, incentivize quick procurement cycles for space and unmanned systems, and institutionalize joint wargaming with U.S. and allied partners that centers space-enabled targeting.

In her response to an opposition lawmaker’s question in the Diet on Nov. 7, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait would represent “a situation threatening Japan’s survival.” The remarks were widely seen as an indication of the conditions that could compel the Japanese military to become involved in a conflict over Taiwan.

The rare earth dilemma has not disappeared. The United States will remain structurally vulnerable when the truce expires, with China retaining majority processing share for most elements. But the one-year pause bought exactly the window needed to blunt China’s most potent coercion tool. By November 2026, the card will still exist. It just won’t hit anywhere near as hard.

Many States are now facing the threat posed by vessels suspected of engaging in sabotaging submarine cable infrastructure. This has been an issue in the Baltic Sea, and in recent years Taiwan has also been forced to deter and counter attacks on submarine communication cables.

Compared to the nuclear submarines, Trump’s subsequent summit with Xi in Gyeongju was an anticlimax. It was more of a pause than a final settlement in their economic contest.

The 2025 edition of Taiwan’s civil defense handbook represents a marked evolution in both substance and presentation, as the government seeks to recalibrate its crisis communications with the public in light of shifting security challenges and lessons from global crises. Among its most significant advancements is the explicit integration of cognitive warfare and disinformation defense.