The Prospect Foundation

  • 李世暉(Shih-hui Li) 政治大學日本研究學位學程教授
  • 黃信豪(Hsin-hao Huang) 臺灣師範大學公民教育與活動領導學系副教授
  • 劉文菲(Wen-fei Liu) 政治大學日本研究學位學程碩士
  • 郭銘傑(Jason M. Kuo) 臺灣大學政治學系助理教授
Published 2023/03/07

Prospect Quarterly 24-1

High-level Leading Small Groups in the Xi Era: The CCP’s Guerrilla Policy Style

 

Hsin-hao Huang

(Professor, Department of Civic Education and Leadership,
National Taiwan Normal University)

 

Abstract

 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established several highlevel leading small groups (LSG) led by Xi Jinping after he assumed power, reintroducing long-standing mechanisms with in the party. This paper employs the concept of “guerrilla policy style” to explain the development of high-level leading small groups in the Xi era. This emphasizes the adoption of tactical and operational approaches to achieve the CCP’s core strategic objectives. This study analyzes CCP documents, published information, and the Official Gazette launched by the CG/CCDR to discuss how high-level LSGs can play an important role in Xi’s centralization of power, as well as their various iterations during Xi’s first term. At present, this mechanism has been legalized and widely implemented with in China’s top decision-making system.

Keywords: CCP, Leading Small Groups, Xi Jinping, Guerrilla Policy Style, Central Leading Group/Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CG/CCDR)

 

Japan’s South Pacific Policy: Prospects of Strategic Interests

 

Shih-hui Li
(Professor, Program in Japan Studies, National Chengchi University)
Wen-fei Liu
(Master, Program in Japan Studies, National Chengchi University)

 

Abstract

 After Japan proposed the “Kuranari Doctrine” in 1987,Tokyo launched its South Pacific diplomatic strategy. This also led to the establishment of the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) as a regular dialogue platform in 1997. With the drastic changes in international politics and economy, the strategic interests of the South Pacific for Japan can be understood in terms of security, economy and diplomacy. The security value of the South Pacific to Japan is mainly to maintain transportation routes, establish a legal maritime order, and balance the threat of Chinese expansion. Japan’s economic interests in the South Pacific, meanwhile, are mainly to consolidate distant-water fisheries, mineral resources, trade and investment, and energy supply. On the diplomatic front, Japan’s interests in the South Pacific lie in Tokyo’s efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, consolidating political power, and cooperation in international affairs.

Keywords: Japan, South Pacific, Strategic Interest, PALM, Kuranari Doctrine

 

Strategic Ambiguity or Clarity? The Bargaining Theory of War and the Rationalist Foundation of U.S. Policy toward the Taiwan Strait

 

Jason M. Kuo
(Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University)

 

Abstract

 Should the U.S. government abandon its longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity” and replace it with “strategic clarity” toward the Taiwan Strait? Since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. foreign policy community has had divergent perspectives. This essay provides a synthetical review of this debate and applies the bargaining theory of war to reexamine the rationalist foundation of the U.S. strategic clarity toward the Taiwan Strait formally. It argues that strategic clarity, defined as “the U.S. will certainly join Taiwan to counter China when a war occurs across the Taiwan Strait,” cannot maintain peace and stability across the Strait due to the absence of a rationalist foundation. Deduced from the bargaining theory of war, this article shows that other things being equal, if the U.S.were to adopt a policy of strategic clarity, it would not only give China the incentive to wage a “preventive” war for de facto unification, but also give Taiwan the incentive to drag the U.S. into a war in the Taiwan Strait by violating China’s “red lines.” One way or another, this would jeopardize peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific and contradict the U.S. policy objectives stated in Taiwan Relations Act. Even if the rapid rise of China relative to the U.S. has dramatically altered the international environment, this paper argues that strategic ambiguity remains the most effective U.S. policy to prevent war in the Taiwan Strait.

Keywords: Bargaining Theory of War, Cross-Strait Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity

Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily flect the policy or the position of the Prospect Foundation.
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