Prospect Quarterly 26-3
‘Rule by Law’ and ‘Maintaining Stability by Law’:
The CCP Model and Trends of Securitization Through Legislation in the
National People’s Congress
Wei-feng Tzeng
(Associate Research Fellow,
Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University)
Abstract
Since 2013, particularly following the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has increasingly emphasized national security in the political realm as a response to rising internal and external challenges, which constitutes a trend toward securitization. This article analyzes how this securitization trend is reflected in the legislative work of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and how it has shaped the law-making process and outcomes. Empirical evidence reveals a notable increase in the passage of national security-related laws, accompanied by a more arbitrary legislative process dominated by the Chairperson’s Council of the NPC Standing Committee. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the frequency of references to security and national security in enacted laws has risen sharply compared to previous administrations. Furthermore, the emphasis on national security has extended into non-security domains, consistent with Xi’s broad definition of national security. However, despite the Party’s efforts to tighten control across various sectors through legislative securitization, the regime may face challenges to its legitimacy. A decline in the NPC’s role in interest articulation could exacerbate the regime’s insecurities, undermining the CCP’s authoritarian resilience.
Keywords: CCP, NPC, Securitization, Legislative Work, Authoritarian Resilience
The Outbreak, Evolution, and Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine War:
An Interpretation of the Dual Security Dilemma
Jing-yun Hsu
(Associate Professor,
Graduate Institute of Russian Studies, National Chengchi University)
Abstract
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine under the pretext of “demilitarization” and “denazification.” Since then, the conflict has escalated into a full-blown war, rapidly becoming the largest military confrontation in Europe since World War II. Now entering its fourth year, the war continues within Ukrainian territory, particularly in the eastern regions, causing severe devastation to Ukraine’s land, infrastructure, and civilian population, with millions of refugees fleeing to various parts of Europe. Despite multiple rounds of negotiations and mediation efforts led by global leaders, no consensus on a ceasefire had been reached. This remained the case until Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election on November 5, 2024, marking the beginning of the “Trump 2.0” era and his renewed efforts to broker a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire. This article adopts the theory of the security dilemma and the spiral model to analyze the conflict from its outbreak in 2022 to the present, focusing on both material and psychological contributing factors. It argues that the fundamental cause of the security dilemmas faced by NATO, Russia, and Ukraine lies in each party’s tendency to take measures — often perceived as enhancing their own security — that unintentionally heighten mutual insecurity. This includes the accumulation of unnecessary offensive capabilities, resulting in a paradox where more power ultimately leads to less security.
Keywords: Russia-Ukraine War, Security Dilemmas, Spiral Model, NATO, Ukraine
Assessment of the Possible Emergence of a ‘Russia-North Korea-China Anti-U.S. Alliance’
Following the Russia-Ukraine War: A Perspective on the ‘Dangerous Alliance’
Chun-wei Ma
(Assistant Professor, Graduate Institute of International
Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University)
Abstract
Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Russia has significantly shifted its approach to external alliances in response to severe international sanctions. Russia has sought to deepen its “partnerships” with China and North Korea. Notably, North Korea and China have long been bound by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which is essentially a mutual defense pact. Additionally, in June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which mandates mutual assistance if either party is attacked. This development has raised concerns about the emergence of a trilateral Russia-North Korea-China alliance aimed at countering the United States. This paper employs the “Dangerous Alliance” theory, focusing on the concepts of “internal management” and “external balancing” within alliances to re-examine the bilateral relationships among Russia, North Korea, and China. The findings indicate that the Russia-China partnership is a “balancinghedging alliance,” the North Korea-China alliance a “balancing tethering alliance,” with only the Russia-North Korea partnership qualifying as a “balancing-balancing alliance.” Due to the differences in the nature of these bilateral alliances, the levels of commitment and cohesion among the three parties vary, making it difficult to directly integrate the three into a trilateral alliance. Hence, the possibility of forming a cohesive Russia-North Korea-China alliance remains low.
Keywords: Dangerous Alliance, Russia-Ukraine War, Russia-North Korea-China Relations, Balancing and Bandwagoning, Hedging and Tethering