Fulfilling the Centennial Mission of the People’s Liberation Army:
The Achievements and Dilemmas of the CCP’s Military Modernization
 

Ming-Shih Shen
Research Fellow, Institute for National Defense and Security Research
 

Abstract

　As the People’s Liberation Army approaches its centennial, the Chinese military is actively strengthening its military modernization research and development efforts to deliver a brilliant centennial military achievement. China is accustomed to asymmetric warfare. In its early days, China learned from the Soviet Union about high-tech joint operations, and after the Gulf War, it adopted the United States as its model, copying many of its high-tech weaponry. While China has pursued advanced weaponry by any means necessary, developing what appears to be fifth-generation weapon hardware systems, its actual combat capabilities lag far behind those of the United States. China recognizes that if it wishes to resolve territorial sovereignty issues in the Indo-Pacific region by force, it must confront U.S. military intervention and possess a strong military capability to deter such intervention. Such military needs rely on the R&D of its defense industry. The United States similarly recognizes that deterring China’s reckless military expansion requires maintaining a strong military force and a sufficient gap in military power. Competition between the U.S. and China could potentially spark an arms race in which the participants seek to deter competitors and weaken others.

Keywords: PLA, Military Modernization, Military-Civilian Fusion, Artificial　Intelligence, Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation

 

Possible Chinese Communist Party War Plan
Against Taiwan

Kuo-Cheng Chang
Professor, Center for General Education, Taipei Medical University
 

Abstract

　This article argues that a Chinese campaign against Taiwan would involve a mix of political, intelligence, economic, legal, and military tactics. China could seek to exploit societal divisions, coordinate internal and external actions, showcase force on offshore islands, and target Taiwan’s semiconductor sector to undermine resistance and international support. The driving factor behind Beijing’s strategy is Xi Jinping’s increasing strategic confidence in China’s military capabilities, especially advanced airpower and electronic warfare for blockades and port interdiction. Taiwan’s current defense — focused on F-16 upgrades, UAVs, anti-ship missiles, reserves, and ground air defenses — is insufficient against the PLA’s air superiority. Asymmetric weapons alone offer limited strategic value. Enhancing Taiwan’s air-control with fifth-generation jets like the F-35, interoperable with U.S. forces, would improve deterrence, secure sea routes, raise invasion costs, and send a clear deterrent signal. Modernizing airpower and asymmetric defenses should work together as complementary strategies.

Keywords: Taiwan Strait, Coercion, Strategic Confidence, Air Superiority, A2/AD

 

Everyday Infiltration:
CCP Cognitive Operations and Their Electoral Influence in Taiwan

Yu-Hsi Liu
Associate Professor, Department of Communications Management, Shih Hsin University
Chien-Yuan Sher
Associate Professor, Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University
 

Abstract

　As geopolitical risks intensify, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly resorting to cognitive warfare as a lower-cost pathway to control Taiwan. Unlike Russia, China tends to begin with in-person engagement to build interpersonal networks that later serve as conduits for disinformation and narrative persuasion. These hybrid tactics allow cognitive operations to escalate into a “narrative war,” embedding themselves deeply into daily life. Econometric analysis and field studies conducted by the authors of this paper reveal that these infiltration efforts have had a statistically significant impact on Taiwan’s elections, with a magnitude capable of changing the final outcomes. The infiltration channels include religious organizations, local political brokers such as village and borough chiefs, media platforms, and economic dependencies. While relationships with proxies may begin with economic incentives, the CCP’s successful engagement with grassroots communities has expanded beyond material interests to include a sense of identity and a misperception of reality. However, there are also positive findings: democratic Taiwan possesses an inherent capacity to resist Chinese infiltration. Communities with stronger resilience prove more difficult to penetrate. To build a resilient society, Taiwan must deepen connections among its citizens while also forging alliances with other democracies that face similar Chinese influence.

Keywords: Chinese Infiltration, Anti-Infiltration, Electoral Intervention, Cognitive　Warfare, United Front