

The Rise of a New Generation in U.S. Congress and Its Implications for the Future of Taiwan-U.S. Relations

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Abstract

The 119th Congress is undergoing the largest generational turnover since systematic tracking began in 1930, with more than 70 members retiring or seeking another office. This paper examines how the incoming generation's foreign-policy orientation is diverging along ideological rather than purely partisan lines, and what this structural shift means for the future of Taiwan-U.S. relations. It finds that bipartisan pro-Taiwan legislation and congressional diplomacy continue to be carried forward by newer members, but that a segment of newer Republicans is markedly more cautious about open-ended overseas commitments than the previous, more hawkish generation it is replacing, introducing a certain level of uncertainty that Taiwan's congressional engagement strategy has yet to fully absorb. As a result, Taiwan should treat congressional goodwill as a dynamic relationship requiring sustained, cross-generational cultivation rather than a static, self-sustaining asset.

Keywords: Midterm Election, U.S. Congress, Republican Party, Democratic Party, Taiwan-U.S. Relations

I. Introduction

Taiwan's visibility in the U.S. Congress has risen markedly over the past decade, a trend now well established in the literature on Taiwan-U.S. relations.¹ Existing

1. Ashley Yi Hui Lee, "In an 'America First' Era, Taiwan Gains Ground in Congress," September 23, 2025, *The Diplomat*, <<https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/in-an-america-first-era-taiwan-gains-ground-in-congress/>>.

analysis tends to focus on executive-branch policy, arms sales, and trade negotiations, or to treat congressional goodwill toward Taiwan as a relatively stable aggregate condition. Comparatively, less attention has gone to the individual members and the generational structure that sustain that goodwill, and to how that structure is now changing.

Between 2025 and 2026, the 119th Congress experienced the largest wave of member departures since systematic tracking began in 1930, with 72 sitting members, 14 senators and 58 representatives having announced their retirement or a run for another office as of late May 2026, a modern record.² At the same time, a considerable number of older members chose to keep running, producing a distinctive period in which old and new generations coexist, and at points actively contest one another for institutional space. The scale and pace of this turnover coincide with a period in which Taiwan has become a prominent subject of congressional attention, making the interaction between the two trends worth examining more closely.

This paper asks three questions. First, what structurally drives this wave of turnover, and is its scale historically distinctive? Second, do incoming members display a different distribution of foreign-policy orientations toward China and Taiwan than the departing generation? Third, what opportunities and risks does this shift pose for Taiwan-U.S. relations? The paper takes a macro, trend-based approach rather than a single-member case study, aiming to establish a structural picture that can inform both further research and near-term policy responses. This responds to a gap in how Taiwan's policy community typically monitors Washington. Congressional relations work has tended to track Taiwan-related legislation and high-profile visits as discrete events, without asking whether the underlying composition of Congress, and the assumptions embedded in "traditional" pro-Taiwan constituencies, still hold for an incoming cohort with different formative experiences, different districts, and, in some cases, a different view of the U.S.' role in the world.

2. Stephen Fowler, "The Record-Setting Pace of Retirements from Congress Continues, Led by Republicans," June 25, 2026, *NPR News*, <<https://www.wbur.org/npr/nx-s1-5647318/congress-retirement-2026-house-senate-primary>>.

II. Scale and Drivers of Congressional Turnover

Table 1. 119th Congress Turnover Snapshot

Category	Count
House members not seeking re-election	57
Senators not seeking re-election	11
Members defeated in primary races	6
Total confirmed departures (as of mid-2026)	72+

Sorce: Author’s compilation based on *NPR News* and retirement-tracker reporting, 2026.

The turnover underway is not confined to one party; it is a structural trend spanning both. By late 2025, a total of 54 members had already announced they would retire or seek another office, a modern record for this point so far ahead of an election, including a dozen House members and several senators running for governor or other statewide office.³

By mid-2026, the confirmed total had reached 57 House members and 11 senators not returning for the next Congress, with a further six members having lost their primary races outright, pushing the overall number of departures still higher. In terms of seniority, the departing cohort spans decades of accumulated institutional experience. On the Democratic side, the exits of Nancy Pelosi (85), Steny Hoyer (86), and Jerry Nadler (78) mark the close of a leadership generation that shaped House Democratic strategy for nearly two decades; on the Republican side, the departure of Mitch McConnell (83) is similarly emblematic of a passing era.⁴

3 Stephen Fowler, “The Record-Setting Pace of Retirements from Congress Continues, Led by Republicans.”

4 Anthony Iafate “Here’s Some of the Names You Know That Will Not Be Back Next Congress,” May 30, 2026, *AOL*, <<https://www.aol.com/articles/names-know-not-back-next-154740000.html>>.




Figure 1. Congressional Departures in their Historical Context

Source: Author’s compilation based on *NPR News* data.




Figure 2. The Aging, and Now Turning Over, 119th Congress

Source: Author’s compilation based on *NBC News* data.

In terms of age structure, the 119th Congress has been assessed as the third oldest in American history, with an average age of 58.9 at the start of the session, well above the U.S. population's median age of 39.1. The number of members belonging to the Silent Generation,⁵ those born between 1928 and 1945, has fallen from 39 in 2021 to 24 in 2025, indicating that a turnover has been underway for some time but has accelerated noticeably in the current session. Significantly, more than half of the remaining Silent Generation members, including 92-year-old Senator Chuck Grassley and 77-year-old Representative John Larson, who has said those who might replace him “haven’t earned that right yet,” have chosen to seek re-election regardless.⁶ This coexistence of and periodic friction between old and new generations demonstrates that turnover is not a simple linear process but a genuinely contested one.

The factors behind this wave are varied and should not be reduced to a single narrative. Pressure from primary contests and redistricting plays a significant role. Several Republican members have chosen to retire after failing to secure a presidential endorsement, underscoring the president's expanding influence over party nominations.⁷ Numerous retiring members have cited a “toxic partisan atmosphere” within the institution, along with rising concern over political violence, both signs of institutional frustration that appear to weigh as heavily as any single policy dispute.⁸

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5. The Silent Generation refers to the cohort born between 1928 and 1945, a demographic term originating from a 1951 *Time* magazine essay describing the generation as cautious and conformist, shaped by coming of age during the Great Depression and World War II.
 6. Scott Wong & Joe Murphy, “24 Members of Congress Are 80 or Older. More Than Half Are Running for Re-election,” March 30, 2026, *NBC News*, <<https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/congress-oldest-members-run-reelection-80s-rcna249479>>.
 7. Aaron King, “Dozens of Lawmakers Confirmed Out as Congress Faces Sweeping Turnover in 2026,” June 1, 2026, *Federal Times*, <<https://federalisttimes.com/dozens-of-lawmakers-confirmed-out-as-congress-faces-sweeping-turnover-in-2026/>>.
 8. Abby Ward & Molly E. Reynolds, “House Retirement Wave Signals Deep Institutional Frustration,” April 16, 2026, *Brookings Institution*, <<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/house-retirement-wave-signals-deep-institutional-frustration/>>.

Conventional career considerations are also at play, with a number of members giving up their current seats to pursue governorships or Senate seats. And some members have framed their departure in explicitly generational terms. Representative Nadler cited President Biden's 2024 withdrawal from the presidential race, following age-related concerns, as a cautionary precedent, arguing that the party needs a younger generation to meet current challenges.⁹ It is worth situating this wave within a longer historical arc. The current cycle's 58 House departures are exceeded only by the 65 recorded ahead of the 1992 election, a cycle remembered for redistricting-driven turnover and a wave of scandal-related exits, making the present wave the second-largest since recordkeeping began nearly a century ago.¹⁰ Unlike 1992, this wave coincides with an unusually polarized and, by several retiring members' own accounts, personally taxing institutional environment, as well as a presidency exercising unusually direct influence over primary outcomes. Taken together, these drivers combine institutional factors, including redistricting, primary pressure, and party discipline, with a genuine generational self-awareness narrative in which senior members voluntarily cede ground, suggesting that the incoming cohort is unlikely to represent merely a lower average age; it is likely to bring with it a substantive shift in ideological orientation and legislative style.

III. The Ideological Spectrum of the New Generation

The most consequential aspect of this turnover, from the standpoint of Taiwan-U.S. relations, is not the age figures themselves but the way foreign-policy orientations are diverging within the incoming cohort. Contrary to the intuitive assumption that a younger generation would necessarily be more internationalist, incoming members display a genuine spectrum, and in some respects an internally contradictory range, of foreign-policy dispositions, most visibly within the Republican caucus.

9. Kierra Frazier, "Democratic Rep. Jerry Nadler to Retire from Congress, Citing Need for 'Generational Change'," September 2, 2025, *CBS News*, <<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-rep-jerry-nadler-retire-congress/>>.

10. Stephen Fowler, "The Record-Setting Pace of Retirements from Congress Continues, Led by Republicans."

Table 2. Comparative Ideological Orientations Toward China/Taiwan Policy

Dimension	Traditional GOP Hawks	“America First” Republicans	Democrats (post-turnover)
View of China as strategic competitor	Strong	Strong	Strong
Support for unconditional ally commitments	High	Cautious / conditional	Moderate–High
Preferred framework	Value-based alliance	Transactional / burden-sharing	Democracy / human-rights based
Overseas military intervention appetite	Higher	Lower	Moderate
Pro-Taiwan legislative engagement	High	Moderate–High, issue-dependent	High

Source: Author’s analysis of sources cited in Section III.

Retiring Representative Michael McCaul exemplifies a traditional Republican foreign-policy hawk generation that has long advocated a firm posture toward Russian and Chinese expansion, publicly warning, upon announcing his retirement, of the dangers of continued Russian aggression. Observers note that this hawkish tradition faces challenges and dilution from a younger cohort of Republican members considerably more skeptical of open-ended overseas military commitments.¹¹ These newer members largely share the broader consensus treating China as a strategic competitor, but on whether to commit to overseas military intervention or support traditional allies unconditionally, their instincts run closer to the transactional logic of “America First” than to a framework of value-based alliance commitments.

This divergence carries a dual implication for Taiwan. On one hand, the consensus positioning China as the foremost strategic competitor has not visibly fractured across generations, so pro-Taiwan legislation framed around “countering China” continues to command cross-generational support. On the other hand, should

11. Meg Kinnard & Maya Sweedler, “Tracking the Retirement Announcements of Members of Congress,” January 9, 2026, *Associated Press*, <<https://apnews.com/article/house-retirements-midterms-f638d386d4d1342e3a9671642dd883f6>>.

an actual military crisis emerge in the Taiwan Strait, whether this newer cohort would support concrete intervention commitments or defense-related resource allocations remains considerably more uncertain, meaning the older assumption that “Republican equals pro-Taiwan” can no longer be straightly applied.

This intra-party tension is not merely rhetorical; it maps onto live legislative debates that bear directly on China policy, including disputes over the scope of technology export controls such as the *GAIN AI Act*, and continued skepticism, voiced by China hawks across both wings of the Republican conference, toward the adequacy of safeguards in the restructured TikTok divestment arrangement.¹² These debates illustrate that even members who agree on the broad framing of China as a strategic rival can diverge sharply on the specific instruments, including export controls, investment screening, and forward military posture, through which that rivalry should be managed. For Taiwan, this means a lawmaker’s general rhetorical toughness on Beijing is an increasingly unreliable predictor of that same lawmaker’s position on questions with direct bearing on Taiwan’s security, such as forward-deployed force posture, contingency planning, or the pace and scale of arms transfers.

Compared to the intra-party contestation on the Republican side, generational turnover within the Democratic caucus more closely resembles continuity of line with renewal of faces. Multiple senior Democratic members, in announcing their retirements, have explicitly framed their departure as making way for a younger, more energetic generation better positioned to confront the current political climate, rather than as reflecting substantive policy disagreement.¹³ On the whole, the Democratic Party’s cross-generational consensus on China’s human-rights record, economic coercion, and Taiwanese democracy remains comparatively stable, consistent with the broader hardening of Democratic China policy over the past decade.

12. Brett Fetterly & Abhi Reddy, “The Big Picture, U.S. Domestic Politics and China in 2025 and 2026,” January 2026, *The Asia Group*, <<https://theasiagroup.com/us-domestic-politics-china-in-2025-2026/>>.

13. Kierra Frazier, “Democratic Rep. Jerry Nadler to Retire from Congress, Citing Need for ‘Generational Change’.”

It is worth noting that the framing of Taiwan, alongside Ukraine and Israel, as a “democratic frontline resisting authoritarian expansion” has become a shared rhetorical resource across both parties in Congress since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and this framing has not weakened as generations have turned over. Related research identifies 2017-2018 as the key inflection point at which congressional China policy shifted from moderate to hawkish; since then, regardless of whether the Biden or Trump administration has held office, both parties have maintained a high degree of consistency in their hawkish orientation toward China.¹⁴ This constitutes the established political climate that incoming members inherit upon entering Congress. In other words, the pairing of “tough on China, friendly to Taiwan” has already acquired a substantial degree of path dependency, and is unlikely to be fundamentally reversed by generational turnover in the near term.

IV. Opportunities and Risks for Taiwan-U.S. Relations

Table 3. Selected Pro-Taiwan Legislation, 119th Congress

Bill	Lead Sponsor(s)	Date	Status / Purpose
H.R. 910, <i>Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act</i>	Rep. Young Kim (R-CA); Rep. Al Green (D-TX)	Mar. 2025	Passed House Financial Services Cmte.; supports Taiwan’s IMF bid
S. 1588, <i>Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act</i>	Sen. Curtis (R-UT); Sen. Merkley (D-OR)	May 2025	4 th reintroduction; TRA cooperation, sharp-power reporting
S.1216 / H.R. 2559, <i>Taiwan Allies Fund Act</i>	Sen. Van Hollen (D-MD); Rep. Krishnamoorthi (D-IL)	2025	Introduced in both chambers
H.R. 4860, <i>U.S.-Taiwan Defense Innovation Partnership Act</i>	Rep. Nunn (R-IA); Rep. Tokuda (D-HI); Rep. Moolenaar (R-MI)	Aug. 2025	Defense-industrial cooperation with Taiwan’s MND

Source: Author’s compilation based on congressional press releases, FAPA, and Congress.gov.

The legislative record shows a substantial number of pro-Taiwan bills led or actively co-sponsored by newer members of Congress over the past two years.

14. Ashley Yi Hui Lee, “In an ‘America First’ Era, Taiwan Gains Ground in Congress.”

Representative Young Kim's *Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act* (H.R. 910), co-led with Representative Al Green and aimed at supporting Taiwan's participation in the International Monetary Fund, passed the House Financial Services Committee in March 2025.¹⁵ Senators John Curtis and Jeff Merkley reintroduced the *Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act* (S. 1588) for a fourth time in May 2025, calling for continued cooperation under the Taiwan Relations Act framework, support for Taiwan's international participation, and reporting on countering Chinese sharp-power operations.¹⁶

The *Taiwan Allies Fund Act*, introduced respectively by Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi,¹⁷ and the *U.S.-Taiwan Defense Innovation Partnership Act* (H.R. 4860), introduced by Representative Zach Nunn with a bipartisan group including Representative Tokuda and Representative John Moolenaar,¹⁸ round out a legislative record increasingly driven by newer and mid-career members.

Table 4. July-August 2026 Congressional Delegation to Taiwan

U.S. Delegation Members	Taiwan Officials Met
Rep. Young Kim (R-CA), lead	President Lai Ching-te
Rep. Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)	Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim
Rep. Michael Cloud (R-TX)	Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung
Rep. Randy Feenstra (R-IA)	Senior defense and national security officials

Source: Author's compilation based on American Institute in Taiwan reporting.

15. Young Kim, "Rep. Young Kim's Bipartisan Bill to Support Taiwan Passes Committee," press release, March 5, 2025, *Rep. Young Kim*, <<https://youngkim.house.gov/2025/03/05/rep-young-kims-bipartisan-bill-to-support-taiwan-passes-committee>>.

16. Young Kim, "US Senators Reintroduce Bill to Support Taiwan," press release, May 9, 2025, *Rep. Young Kim*, <<https://youngkim.house.gov/2025/05/09/us-senators-reintroduce-bill-to-support-taiwan/>>.

17. Formosan Association for Public Affairs, "Taiwan Bills (119th Congress)," September 4, 2026 accessed, *Formosan Association for Public Affairs*, <<https://fapa.org/taiwan-bills/>>.

18. 119th Congress, "H.R. 4860, U.S.-Taiwan Defense Innovation Partnership Act," August 1, 2025, *Congress.gov*, <<https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/4860>>.

Congressional visits display a similar pattern of generational handover. From late July through early August 2026, a delegation led by Representative Young Kim visited Taiwan, with Representatives Suhas Subramanyam, Michael Cloud, and Randy Feenstra, a relatively young, bipartisan group, meeting President Lai Ching-te, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung, and senior defense and national security officials.¹⁹ Such bipartisan, cross-generational visits remain an important channel for institution-building, distributing Taiwan-relevant capacity beyond a handful of veteran champions to a broader and younger bench of committee members. This distribution matters analytically. It reduces the degree to which Taiwan's congressional standing depends on any single champion's tenure and creates multiple entry points for relationship-building before members rise to committee leadership, though it also places a premium on Taiwan's ability to identify, early and accurately, which newer members are likely to become durable long-term interlocutors rather than one-time visitors.

Even as this momentum largely persists, Taiwan must reckon with a policy gap between Congress and the executive branch that has persisted, and may even be widening. Since the start of its second term, the Trump administration has sent a number of signals that have raised concern in Taiwan. These include tariffs imposed on Taiwan and most other trading partners beginning in April 2025, followed by a January 2026 trade agreement setting a 15 percent tariff rate; repeated public statements by President Trump alleging Taiwan "stole" the U.S. semiconductor industry; and, during a May 2026 summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing, remarks in a media interview suggesting [the leadership in Taiwan] "wants to go independent," comments that deepened concerns in Taiwanese society about the durability of U.S. commitments. On arms sales, testimony at congressional budget hearings in June 2026 by Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio confirmed that a US\$14 billion arms package remained "under review," underscoring executive-branch hesitancy that contrasts with Congress's continued legislative advocacy.²⁰

19. American Institute in Taiwan, "U.S. Congressional Delegation Concludes Visit to Taiwan," August 1, 2026, *AIT*, <<https://www.ait.org.tw/us-congressional-delegation-concludes-visit-to-taiwan-young-kim-2026/>>.

20. Congressional Research Service, "Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations," August 5, 2026, *Congress.gov*, <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10275>>.




Figure 3. Taiwan’s Special Defense Budget, Proposed vs. Approved (2026)

Source: Author’s compilation based on CRS IF12481.




Figure 4. U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan

Source: Author’s compilation based on CRS IF12481.

At the same time, Taiwan's own defense resource commitments face domestic political constraints. In May 2026, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed a US\$24.8 billion special budget for U.S. arms procurement, a figure 38 percent lower than the executive branch's original proposal, reflecting significant contestation between Taiwan's executive branch and its opposition-controlled legislature over defense resource allocation. This is set against a backdrop in which the United States has notified Congress of more than US\$39 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan since 2015, including US\$11.1 billion in a single notification on December 17, 2025, the largest for Taiwan to date, even as Taiwan's own president has said he intends to raise defense spending to around 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026.²¹ Even a highly motivated Congress cannot indefinitely substitute for unsatisfactory self-defense investment on Taiwan's own part; if Taiwan does not match U.S. willingness with its own resource commitment, the persuasiveness and durability of Congress's pro-Taiwan discourse could be undermined over time.

A more fundamental risk is that current congressional goodwill rests, to a significant degree, on the relatively abstract and symbolic consensus of "countering China," rather than on tested support for concrete defense commitments or crisis-response mechanisms. Should an actual crisis emerge in the Taiwan Strait, the voting




Figure 5. Key Executive-Branch Signals on Taiwan Policy, 2025-2026

Source: Author's compilation based on CRS IF10275.

21. Congressional Research Service, “Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues,” June 18, 2026, *Congress.gov*, <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12481>>.

behavior of this newer cohort may not necessarily track its customary rhetorical positions, and Taiwan risks underestimating this latent uncertainty if it relies solely on bill counts or visit frequency as a proxy for the depth of support. This risk is compounded by the sheer scale of leadership churn occurring alongside generational turnover. The departure of figures such as Pelosi, Hoyer, and Nadler removes not only individual votes but decades of institutional memory regarding how prior Taiwan-related crises were managed procedurally within Congress. Newer members will by definition lack this direct institutional memory and will instead rely on staff, committee counsel, and outside expert briefings to reconstruct it, a vulnerability in the near term, but also an opportunity for Taiwan's own foreign-policy research community to help fill that gap, provided it invests deliberately in doing so.

V. Policy Implications and Taiwan's Strategic Response

Given this combination of opportunity and risk, Taiwan should consider several adjustments to how it manages its congressional relationships going forward. First, Taiwan should deepen cross-generational and cross-partisan relationship-building rather than relying disproportionately on personal ties to specific senior members. As indicator figures such as Pelosi and McConnell exit the institution, Taiwan needs to establish substantive engagement, including invitations, briefings, and academic exchanges, with newly elected or relatively younger members early on, gradually shifting the basis of these relationships from personal rapport toward institutionalized partnership. Second, Taiwan should recognize the internal divergence among newer Republican members rather than relying on simplified partisan labels. Outreach should more precisely distinguish "traditional hawks" from members aligned with the "America First" line, developing a security-and-values case for the former and a more narrowly economic case, centered on semiconductor supply-chain resilience and direct district-level stakes, for the latter, whose support is more contingent on tangible domestic benefit. Third, Taiwan should invest specifically in staff-level relationships, not only member-level ones. Congressional staff often remain in place across multiple election cycles even as members themselves change, and represent an underappreciated channel of continuity; systematic engagement with committee staff and legislative directors can help preserve Taiwan expertise inside congressional offices independent of any single member's tenure.

Fourth, Taiwan should strengthen the credibility of its own defense investment to reinforce the legitimacy of pro-Taiwan discourse in Congress. Legislation and visits matter, but over the long term only a self-defense commitment commensurate with the threat can keep bipartisan pro-Taiwan consensus from becoming a symbolic gesture without substantive content. Fifth, Taiwan should closely monitor the gap between executive and congressional policy and use Congress deliberately as a mechanism for offsetting executive-branch uncertainty, through legislation, budgetary oversight, and hearings. Sixth, Taiwan's academic and policy research community should track this generational transition empirically, rather than impressionistically, particularly as the 120th Congress takes shape following the November 2026 midterm elections, when the effects of the current retirement wave will become fully apparent.

VI. Conclusion

This paper has used the unprecedented generational turnover in the 119th Congress as an entry point for examining its structural implications for Taiwan-U.S. relations. Despite the scale of the retirement wave and the departure of several senior members of Congress — many of them long associated with support for Taiwan — overall congressional visibility and bipartisan backing for Taiwan have not visibly weakened in the near term: pro-Taiwan legislation and visits continue to be carried forward and advanced by newer members. However, the newer generation, particularly Republicans who lean toward the “America First” line, displays a degree of caution regarding concrete defense commitments and overseas intervention that differs from the hawkish generation it is replacing, introducing a variable that cannot responsibly be ignored with respect to the depth and resilience of congressional consensus on Taiwan.

Taiwan should not treat U.S. congressional goodwill as a static, self-evident asset, but should instead understand it as a dynamic relationship requiring sustained, cross-generational cultivation. Longstanding Taiwanese American organizations such as the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), founded in 1982 and now sustaining grassroots chapters across the United States, have tracked Congress for more than four decades and offer Taiwan's government a proven channel for reading this new terrain in the aftermath of the midterm elections. Only by squarely

confronting the uncertainty introduced by generational turnover, proactively developing a diversified and institutionalized strategy for congressional engagement that draws on such networks, and simultaneously strengthening the credibility of its own defense commitments, can Taiwan continue to consolidate the substantive foundations of Taiwan-U.S. relations amid the long-term generational shift underway in American politics.