

# Impact of the 'Board of Peace' on the Multilateral International Order

**Kuo-Cheng Chang**

*Professor, Center for General Education, Taipei Medical University*

## **Abstract**

Established in early 2026 by U.S. President Donald Trump, the Board of Peace (BoP) represents a radical departure from traditional multilateralism. While its charter mimics the formal language of post-World War II international organizations, its substantive design is highly personalized and centralized, prioritizing transactional efficiency over sovereign equality. The BoP emerged from a governance vacuum following the Gaza war and growing dissatisfaction with the United Nations' perceived paralysis. A defining feature of the BoP is its "corporatization" of international governance. It effectively transforms international participation into "club goods" through a US\$1 billion membership fee, which allows wealthy nations to waive term limits and institutionalize their influence. This design challenges the UN principle of sovereign equality, potentially marginalizing smaller nations. Furthermore, the power structure is heavily weighted toward the Chairman, who holds final discretion over resolutions, vetoes, and charter interpretations. The organization faces significant legal and structural hurdles. Despite its broad mission to secure global peace, the BoP currently lacks a mandate outside of Gaza, as authorized by UN Resolution 2803. Domestically, its status as an "executive agreement" rather than a treaty means it lacks congressional funding and long-term legal stability in the U.S. Additionally, its military model — relying on regional allies for ground troops while the U.S. retains command — creates a dangerous "responsibility and risk asymmetry." While pragmatically supported by some Middle Eastern countries for its ability to achieve speedy results, the BoP is viewed with skepticism by European powers and used by China as a foil to champion the original UN Charter. Ultimately, the BoP is a "quasi-international governance experiment" whose survival depends more on Trump's personal political capital than on established international law.

**Keywords:** Donald Trump, Gaza, Board of Peace, United Nations, Peacekeeping

## I. Introduction

In early 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump established the “Board of Peace” (BoP), with its official charter announced in January of the same year. At first glance, the charter appears to follow the standard constitutional template of an international organization: it contains a preamble, defined purposes, membership criteria, governance structures, financial arrangements, legal personality, and procedures for constitutional amendment. In form, it closely imitates the institutional language and design of post WWII multilateral organizations.<sup>1</sup>



**Figure 1. President Trump Speaks at the Inaugural Meeting of the Peace Council**

Source: The White House, “President Donald Trump participates in the Board of Peace Charter Announcement and Signing ceremony,” January 22, 2026, *The White House*, <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/gallery/president-donald-trump-participates-in-the-board-of-peace-charter-announcement-and-signing-ceremony/>>.

1. Steve Holland, “Trump launches Board of Peace that some fear rivals UN,” January 23, 2026, *Reuters*, <<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-launch-board-peace-that-some-fear-rivals-un-2026-01-22/>>.

A closer reading, however — especially when placed alongside the responses of various states and the broader context of international law — reveals a different reality. The BoP represents an institutional design that is highly “international” in appearance, yet markedly personalized and centralized in its substantive allocation of power.

More importantly, the emergence of the BoP did not occur in a vacuum. Its creation was shaped by the convergence of three structural conditions: first, the governance vacuum and reconstruction demands following the Gaza war; second, longstanding dissatisfaction with the effectiveness and legitimacy of the United Nations’ collective security system; and third, Trump’s personal governing style, characterized by a strong preference for transaction-based decision-making, efficiency, and hierarchical dominance.

This paper examines the structural problems embedded in the BoP Charter and assesses its potential trajectories and implications for the future international order.

## II. The Origin of the System and Characteristics of the Charter

The original reason for the establishment of the BoP is highly related to the post-war governance of Gaza. The relevant UN Security Council resolution in November 2025 authorizes a limited, time-sensitive (until the end of 2027) stabilization and reconstruction mechanism in Gaza. Under this framework, the BoP can be understood as a “Security Council outsourcing tool”: governance and reconstruction implementation are undertaken by voluntarily participating countries.<sup>2</sup>

However, the charter shows a highly unusual characteristic: the word “Gaza” does not appear at all in the full text. Instead, it is a very broad mission statement, such as: “The Board of Peace is an international organization that seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict...including the development and dissemination

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2. Jacob Magid, “Full text: Charter of Trump’s Board of Peace,” January 18, 2026, *The Times of Israel*, <<https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-charter-of-trumps-board-of-peace/>>.



**Figure 2. World Leaders Discuss the Gaza Issue at the Inaugural Meeting of the BoP**

Source: The White House, “Trump, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and other leaders at the Board of Peace meeting,” February 20, 2026, *Wikipedia*, <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Board\\_of\\_Peace#/media/File:President\\_Trump\\_and\\_Vice\\_President\\_Vance\\_at\\_the\\_Board\\_of\\_Peace\\_meeting\\_\(HBnh7p0XgAl3n-C\).jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Board_of_Peace#/media/File:President_Trump_and_Vice_President_Vance_at_the_Board_of_Peace_meeting_(HBnh7p0XgAl3n-C).jpg)>.

of best practices capable of being applied by all nations and communities seeking peace.” The text of the Charter shows that the BoP is designed as a standing tool that can operate in different conflict zones, rather than a one-off, regionally bound transitional arrangement. If the BoP’s actual actions go beyond Gaza, its legitimacy can no longer simply depend on the existing Security Council mandate, but must face a separate test of legitimacy under international law.

The BoP’s membership system completely deviates from the principle of sovereign equality of post-war multilateralism. Its charter states that:

- Membership is limited to countries invited by the Chair;

- The term of office of ordinary members is three years;
- However, if you donate US\$1 billion in cash within the first year, you can waive the three-year term limit.

This design may not be an obvious violation of convention in international law, but it is bound to have a huge impact on the political and normative levels. That is because it transforms “financial capacity” into “institutional status,” making the BoP more like a club that has to pay high membership fees rather than an international organization based on equal representation. For small and medium-sized countries, this is not just a matter of financial burden, but also the risk of institutionalized exclusion of influence structures.



**Figure 3. The UN Security Council**

Source: Per Krohg, “United Nations Security Council on the United Nations Headquarters in New York City,” January 5, 2014, *Wikipedia*, <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_Nations#/media/File:UN-Sicherheitsrat\\_-\\_UN\\_Security\\_Council\\_-\\_New\\_York\\_City\\_-\\_2014\\_01\\_06.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations#/media/File:UN-Sicherheitsrat_-_UN_Security_Council_-_New_York_City_-_2014_01_06.jpg)>.

The BoP's linking of governance privileges to monetary contributions in the Charter may raise concerns about the fairness and integrity of the organization, as it would make the Council's decisions easily biased towards the interests of wealthy sponsors and undermine the principle of sovereign equality (Article 2(1) of the UN Charter), which enshrines everything the voice of the nation should be respected, regardless of size or wealth. If this principle is abandoned, international organizations may no longer be about protecting the weak, but about safeguarding the interests of funders. This not only challenges the post-World War II international order, but may also induce confrontation between small regional groups, as small and medium-sized countries may turn to other regional powers that can provide influence in search of protection.

According to the UN Charter, the primary responsibility for international peace and security rests with the Security Council (Article 24). Any "global mandate" to resolve conflicts usually requires UN Security Council authorization or multilateral treaties between countries. In the case of the BoP, Resolution 2803 authorizes the Commission to be responsible only for Gaza, and only until 2027, as part of the ceasefire transitional governance plan. The mandate is narrow — "focused on the Gaza conflict" — and has a limited time. In contrast, the language of the BoP Charter and the invitation letter that accompanied Trump show that it intends to extend to other conflicts indefinitely. However, there are currently no Security Council resolutions or treaties giving the BoP a role in global peacekeeping or governance outside of Gaza.

Therefore, unless explicitly authorized by a new UN Security Council resolution or an international agreement, any claim to the Council's power to intervene in global conflicts lacks a clear legal basis. Acting without such authority may be contrary to the framework of the UN Charter, which does not recognize the imposition of peace agreements on a global scale by independent bodies without the consent of the UN or the host country.

In its pursuit of broad authorization, the BoP seems to have "ignored the basic principles of the UN Charter." One of the core principles is national sovereignty



**Figure 4. What Remains of a Street in Northern Gaza**

Source: Jaber Jihad Badwan, “A street in northern Gaza pictured in the aftermath of the siege during the initial phase of the 2025 ceasefire,” February 22, 2025, *Wikipedia*, <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza\\_war#/media/File:Images\\_of\\_war\\_23-25\\_from\\_Gaza,\\_by\\_Jaber\\_Badwen,\\_IMG\\_5670.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_war#/media/File:Images_of_war_23-25_from_Gaza,_by_Jaber_Badwen,_IMG_5670.jpg)>.

and consent: under international law, external intervention in conflicts or territorial management usually requires the consent of the affected country or a binding UN Security Council Chapter VII decision. In practice, the Vienna Convention means that the BoP must not legally impose governance or conflict resolution services on a country or territory that has not consented. For the Council to operate globally, it must be by voluntary invitation from the relevant countries or authorized by the United Nations in all aspects. Without these, its “global mandate” would be idealized and may be illegal if it attempts to override national consent or UN authority.<sup>3</sup>

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3. Brian Brivati, “International Law and the Trump Board of Peace Charter,” January 21, 2026, *Arab Center Washington DC*, <<https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/international-law-and-the-trump-board-of-peace-charter/>>.

Of course, one of the reasons why Trump proposed the establishment of this committee is dissatisfaction with the efficiency of the United Nations. The United Nations is an institution subject to the “veto system” and “consensus decision.” Each resolution must go through negotiations involving countless member states, which while conferring a high degree of legitimacy to the action, also often leads to paralysis.

The United Nations was founded with the aim and logic of providing global public goods that anyone can benefit from through peace, which has led to a serious “free-riding” problem. Trump transformed the BoP into a “club goods” through the “US\$1 billion ticket” system. Only those who pay can participate in decision-making and share in the dividends of post-war reconstruction. This design addresses the issue



**Figure 5. UNRWA Staff Deliver Vital Cold Weather Supplies to Displaced Families in Gaza**

Source: UNRWA, “UNRWA Delivering Vital Cold Weather Supplies to Displaced Families,” January 16, 2026, *Facebook*, <<https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1374185861408409&set=pcb.1374185921408403>>.

of motivation for collective action. After Saudi Arabia or the UAE pays huge sums, there will be a stronger incentive to ensure the success of the organization, because the “sunk cost” of its investment is already tied to the stable depth of Gaza.

This will be a major experiment in international politics, but if it appears to be more effective than the United Nations, it may become a new paradigm and is likely to be resisted by the United Nations. The United Nations Secretariat and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) will inevitably unite with non-permanent members of the Security Council to strengthen the status of the “United Nations Charter” as the highest standard for global governance. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is the deepest governance network in Gaza, and how it interacts with the BoP is a major issue that the BoP must deal with in future. Because all members of the BoP are members of the United Nations, which excessively weakens the status and role of the United Nations in Gaza, it may not be a development that the Middle Eastern members in the BoP want to see.

### **III. Decision-Making Power: Multilateral in Form and Substantive Centralization**

The BoP Charter ostensibly adopts the principle of “one country, one vote,” but almost all key nodes have the final discretion of the Chairman:

- Council resolutions require the approval of the Chairman;
- The decisions of the Executive Committee may be vetoed by the Chairman at any time;
- The final adjudicator of the right to interpret the Charter is the Chairman himself;
- The establishment, modification and dissolution of subsidiary bodies are led by the Chairman;
- The dissolution and continuation of the organization are also decided by the Chairman.

This makes the BoP an institutional hybrid that has never been seen before: it has the appearance of an international organization, yet at the same time the real power structure of a corporate board or private foundation.

The BoP is Trump’s attempt to “corporatize” international governance. By giving the Chairman broad ruling powers, the BoP seeks to reduce the time and cost of decision-making, which is attractive to pragmatists seeking “instant results” at the expense of legal transparency in exchange for speed of action.

Trump’s current executive power is the fuel that allows the BoP to operate, but this fuel has an expiration date. In early 2026, Trump’s poll approval rating hovered between 36% and 41%, indicating domestic fatigue with his diplomatic ventures. If the Republican Party loses control of the House of Representatives in the November 2026 midterm elections, the Democratic Party is likely to launch a large-scale investigation and freeze any federal resources flowing to the BoP. Once the “U.S.



**Figure 6. Trump Announces the U.S. Withdrawal from the United Nations Human Rights Council**

Source: Deepa Shivaram, “Trump Withdrew the U.S. from the United Nations Human Rights Council,” February 4, 2025, *NPR*, <<https://www.npr.org/2025/02/03/nx-s1-5285696/trump-un-human-rights-council-withdrawal>>.

government” and “Trump’s council” are financially disconnected, its deterrence to international allies will be greatly reduced. Not to mention that Trump must step down when his term expires in 2028. How, then, will member states accept Trump’s leadership thenceforth? If the next U.S. president is unwilling, he can sign a new executive order to announce his withdrawal. This is comparable to former President Biden’s decision to re-enter the Paris Climate Agreement on his first day in office, and President Trump’s earlier move to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization at the outset of his administration.

## **IV. Attitudes of Various Countries**

### **1. Middle Eastern Countries: Support under Pragmatism**

Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar and other countries have mostly expressed support or willingness to join the BoP, because the BoP provides a mechanism to bypass the long-standing rigid UN mechanism and quickly mobilize funds and political commitments, which is conducive to the stability of the post-war order. For these countries, efficiency often takes precedence over institutional legitimacy. In fact, the support of Middle Eastern countries is not out of complete trust in the BoP system, but out of hedging against “Trump’s personal execution.” They use the ambiguity of the Charter to achieve short-term regional stability (i.e., ceasefire and reconstruction in Gaza) while avoiding being legally bound into an unknown organizational framework in the long term.

Khaled Meshal, a senior official of the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, rejected the demands of the United States and Israel, emphasizing that the organization will not disarm or accept foreign interference in Gaza’s affairs. According to Meshal, Palestine has set up a technocratic committee to take over the day-to-day governance of the war-torn Gaza Strip, but it is unclear whether the committee will deal with the issue of disarmament or how it will respond. In addition, Meshal also urged the BoP to adopt what he called a “balanced approach” to allow Gaza to rebuild and allow aid to flow into the hands of Gaza’s residents. He also warned that Hamas would not accept foreign rule over Palestinian land. “We abide by the national principle and reject any form of guardianship logic, external interference

or restoration of mandate,” Meshal said, adding that “Palestinians are governed by Palestinians. Gaza belongs to the people of Gaza and also to Palestine. We will not accept foreign rule.”<sup>4</sup>

Weighed against various quick peace plans or “post-war Gaza governance blueprints” proposed in recent years, Meshal’s statement highlights a clear gap. Many scenarios assume that as long as security is taken over by external forces, disarmament occurs, and money begins to flow in, Palestinian society will naturally accept the new order. But this thinking ignores a key reality: peace without political subjectivity cannot be socially recognized and cannot be maintained for a long time. Even if some Palestinians are dissatisfied with Hamas’s line, they still generally have a deep distrust of externally imposed arrangements. This trust gap cannot be easily filled by propaganda or financial aid.

## 2. Europe: Multilateralism and Legitimacy Doubts

Divisions among European countries are the most indicative. Due to geopolitical and historical factors, European countries have always been more concerned about Middle Eastern issues than the rest of the world. Norway, Sweden, and France rejected or were critical of the BoP, with core reasons including that the BoP could weaken the UN collective security system, that the centralized structure violates the spirit of multilateral governance, and that domestic constitutional structures may not be able to authorize participation in such mechanisms. Hungary reflects a different understanding of “sovereign states choosing their own governance tools” and its position is in line with its longstanding critical stance on EU and UN multilateral norms.

The design of the BoP has led most European powers (such as the UK, France, and Germany) to keep their distance over fears that the next U.S. administration may

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4. “Top Hamas leader Khaled Meshal rejects disarmament or ‘foreign rule,’” February 8, 2026, *The Economic Times*, <<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/top-hamas-leader-khaled-meshal-rejects-disarmament-or-foreign-rule/articleshow/128066159.cms>>.

change its mind at any time. If they participate in such an international organization, they may also face doubts from domestic opposition parties. European Council President António Costa admitted that European leaders have “serious doubts” about some elements of the Council. Costa said after attending the EU leaders’ summit held in Brussels, “We have serious doubts about some elements of the Peace Council Charter regarding the scope of functions, governance, and compatibility with the United Nations Charter.”<sup>5</sup>

### 3. The Indo-Pacific and Other Regions: Prudent Strategic Choices

Most countries in the Indo-Pacific remain cautious about the BoP. New Zealand explicitly refused to join, citing “compliance with the UN Charter” and “uncertainty about future expansion.” Some Asian and Central Asian countries have chosen to join, indicating that there are still strong incentives for the stability mechanism led by major powers.


For its part, China has emphasized the United Nations as the main mechanism for handling international disputes, including the Gaza issue, and chose to distance itself from the BoP. This decision is not simply a diplomatic cold war, but a deliberate asymmetric checks-and-balances strategy. By rejecting the BoP’s “money-for-seat” and “personalized command” model, China is positioning itself as the ultimate defender of the current UN Charter and the principle of “sovereign equality.” The aim of this policy is to win over countries in the “Global South” that are uneasy about Trump’s unilateralism and to counteract the informal leadership that the United States has built through the BoP.

Another goal for Beijing is to accelerate the promotion of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). Through the “Second China-Arab Summit” in 2025, China is trying to offer a very different peace model from the BoP: no “membership fee,” no interference in internal affairs, and a focus

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5. “EU leaders ‘have serious doubts’ about Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’: Council president,” January 23, 2026, *Youtube*, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10LPCAsWmZg>>.

on infrastructure and energy linkage.<sup>6</sup> This path of “peace through development” may become another safe-haven option for Middle Eastern countries outside of “Trump business peace.” At the same time, Beijing has not completely closed the door to communication, but has used “whether to cooperate with the BoP on the reconstruction of Gaza” as a key bargaining chip in bilateral negotiations between China and the United States (such as tariff exemptions or the lifting of technology bans).



**Figure 7. Xi Jinping Meets with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung**

Source: 이재명, 〈「폐려야 떨 수 없는 협력 동반자」 중국과 함께 새로운 30년을 향해〉, January 6, 2026, *Facebook*, <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=33179565574991854&set=pb.100000955155655.-2207520000&type=3>>.

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6. 〈第二屆中國—中亞峰會阿斯塔納宣言（全文）〉, June 18, 2025, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, <[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/202506/t20250618\\_11652095.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/202506/t20250618_11652095.shtml)>.

China is also actively improving relations with other Asian countries to prepare for a regional leadership status,<sup>7</sup> but it does not criticize other Asian countries that have elected to participate in the BoP. This “no confrontation, no endorsement, no payment” strategy ensures that China can maintain a strong geopolitical veto even outside the BoP structure.

#### 4. Other Possible Problems

In terms of international law, if the BoP is limited to the Gaza mission authorized by the UN Security Council, its legitimacy will remain relatively stable. However, once it expands to other conflict zones, its actions must be based on the explicit consent of the parties or a new Security Council mandate. Otherwise, the BoP will be seen as a parallel order that bypasses the collective security architecture.

The BoP Charter claims full international legal personality and privileged immunity. This is operationally necessary, but it also raises an age-old question: who is responsible if actions involve human rights abuses, misuse of funds, or governance failures? In the absence of independent judicial or external arbitration mechanisms, responsibility will once again be concentrated back to the chairman and core members, creating a serious accountability gap.

Although the United States is the initiator and the preservation of the charter, its own membership status is questionable. According to the U.S. Constitution and related laws, the United States requires congressional consent to join any international organization. The Trump administration’s current position is to treat the Peace Council Charter as an “executive agreement” rather than an informal one “treaty.” Under the diplomatic power granted to the president under Article II of the Constitution, the president has the power to sign executive agreements without the need for approval by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. This is why he was able to directly announce “approval” and establish the organization in Davos. However, if the council is to

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7. Simina Mistreanu, “China and South Korea pledge to bolster ties as regional tensions rise,” January 5, 2026, *Associate Press*, <<https://apnews.com/article/china-south-korea-trade-lee-xi-venezuela-fe0a027934d91a678481d9b77b9ac0df>>.

operate effectively, it will involve long-term international obligations, significant capital investment, and external governance powers, and its nature should therefore be that of a “treaty.” At present, its legal status is questionable at the level of domestic law without the approval of Congress.

Even if Trump claims that the United States is a member country, under the U.S. Constitution the president does not have the power to directly appropriate funds to pay dues, and Trump must obtain appropriations authorization from Congress if he wants to provide the council with the huge working capital he claims, or even the ticket “permanent seat fee” (US\$1 billion). As of February 2026, the U.S. Congress has not passed any budget specifically for the council. Therefore, from a fiscal point of view, the “membership” of the United States is limited to political commitments and lacks the ability to fulfill substantial funds. That is why Trump signed the document as “chairman” rather than as a representative of the United States. The White House argues that the United States, as the organization’s “initiator” and “headquarters” (although not yet officially operational), has a status beyond that of ordinary members, but the United States is not legally a full member bound by international law until Congress votes to pass the relevant bills. This poses a huge challenge for the sustainability of the organization.

In order to truly maintain peace, a “peacekeeping force” is necessary. Although the charter is logical on paper, “whether the United States will send troops” is always a lingering question. At present, regarding the Gaza issue, the Trump administration has reiterated the principle of “no boots on the ground” and only hopes that Middle Eastern countries will provide troops, with support from the United States. This leads to a paradox: the United States holds command and financial power, but requires other countries to provide soldiers’ lives as guarantees. This model faces serious challenges:

1. Burden of historical records: From Iraq to Afghanistan, the U.S. record of involvement in the Middle East has deeply unsettled regional allies. Countries are worried that once the U.S. military only “gives orders,” when non-American soldiers are ambushed in street fighting in Gaza, will U.S. support retreat due to domestic political pressure?

2. A tug-of-war of interests: While Arab allies (such as the UAE and Egypt) want regional stability, their prices for sending troops to a conflict zone may be extremely high — including a relatively clear timeline for the establishment of a Palestinian state. If the United States cannot make political commitments, the International Stabilization Force (ISF) will become an empty shell.
3. Clear military objectives and guidelines of engagement cannot be defined. The forces participating in an ISF come from several countries (such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan), each with a completely different bottom line for the use of force: the constitutions of many countries prohibit their troops from participating in “peace enforcement” operations without the approval of their own parliaments or without the authorization of the United Nations. This could result in a situation where a U.S. commander gives an order to fire, but a country’s troops may refuse to do so due to a domestic “national restriction clause,” resulting in a potentially fatal loophole on the frontlines.

In traditional multilateral military operations, rules of engagement (ROE) are based on internationally recognized treaties or Security Council resolutions. However, under the BoP structure, as the BoP is not an official sovereign entity and an international organization, which country should be tried if ISF soldiers accidentally injure civilians in Gaza? In the absence of a clear Status of Forces Agreement, militaries often enact extremely conservative and vague policies to protect their own soldiers’ ROE, which causes troops to become unresponsive in the face of rapidly changing urban warfare threats, such as suicide attacks. The current ROE only clarifies the “right to self-defense,” but the definition of “hostile intent” is extremely vague, which can easily lead to misjudgment in densely populated Gaza. Trump’s “peace plan” for Gaza highly emphasizes economic reconstruction (such as building resort hotels and special economic zones), and if implemented, it is likely to lead to confusion about the military’s goals of “protecting private property.” If local people protest a reconstruction project, is the ISF’s goal to “maintain law and order” or to “protect the site of a specific businessman”? This unclear goal can undermine soldier morale and combat focus.

4. Lack of an end state: Militarily, clear goals must have a “when to quit” guideline.

However, the BoP's current goal is to "continue to stabilize until it transforms," which can easily evolve into an indefinite "mission creep" at the tactical level.

Although the United Nations has been criticized, at least it has the function and power to organize international peacekeeping forces. If the BoP does not have this capability, it will be difficult to replace the United Nations.

## V. Conclusion

This analysis demonstrates that the BoP led by Trump is not an international peace mechanism in the traditional sense, but a highly personalized, transactional, and de-institutionalized "quasi-international governance experiment." It tries to bypass the existing UN system and multilateral legal framework, and quickly shape a new type of organization led by the United States but not fully responsible through administrative agreements, capital incentives and military outsourcing. From the



**Figure 8. United Nations Peace Force in Lebanon**

Source: Indonesian Embassy in Beirut, "Korps Marinir BTR-80A of the Indonesian Contingent of UNIFIL during Medal Parade Ceremony at Indobatt Compound in Aadchit Al Qusayr, Southern Lebanon," October 5, 2020, *Wikipedia*, <[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BTR-80\\_of\\_Garuda\\_Indobatt\\_Contingent\\_UNIFIL.png](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BTR-80_of_Garuda_Indobatt_Contingent_UNIFIL.png)>.

perspective of design logic, the BoP does respond to the international community's anxiety about Gaza's "no governance, no security, and no economic prospects," and also demonstrates the cult of efficiency and business intuition of Trump-style politics. However, these traits may also pose its deepest structural risks.

First, at the legal and institutional level, the BoP lacks a clear sovereign foundation and domestic authorization, making its legitimacy overly dependent on Trump's personal executive power and political prestige. Once the U.S. Congress refuses to approve funds, or political party rotation leads to a sharp policy turn, the organization is likely to quickly lose its resources and binding power and become a "shell organization" in international politics. The distancing of most mature democracies from the BoP reflects deep doubts about this highly volatile institutional arrangement.

Second, at the security and military levels, the international stabilization force envisioned by the BoP exposes the typical "responsibility and risk asymmetry" problem: the United States retains command and political gains, but passes on-the-ground risks to soldiers from other countries. In the absence of UN authorization, a clear end-state and consistent rules of engagement, the patchwork operation of multinational forces is likely to lead to delays and a larger political and moral crises after miscalculations and manslaughter.

The first step for the Peace Council to truly function is to shift its function from simply facilitating a ceasefire to participating in the construction of rules and institutions. This means that the Council should not be composed only of businesspeople, retired generals or political loyalists, but must be institutionally composed of international law scholars, experts in regional studies and senior diplomats. At the same time, a reliable mechanism that can continue to operate outside the U.S. political cycle is needed. If we accept that Trump's character and political instincts will not change, then perhaps the most pragmatic way is not to try to make him an institutionalist, but rather to divide the functions: Trump is responsible for forcing his opponents to the negotiating table with a tough stance, while professional bureaucrats and institution designers are responsible for transforming agreements into sustainable order and arrangements.

