

## 數位民粹主義極端化對民主的潛在威脅： 以「英格蘭防衛同盟」為例

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### 摘要

「數位民粹主義」運用數位科技作為政治人物與民眾參與政治的溝通動員工具，訴諸直接民主激發民眾脫離代議政治，以極端或歧視意圖推翻或破壞既有民主體制。本文檢視民粹主義理論文獻論述其特質與運作，藉以觀察分析英國民粹主義團體－「英格蘭防衛同盟」(the English Defence League)，藉由社群媒體傳播反伊斯蘭教及反「伊斯蘭國」恐怖主義觀點，並以暴力施壓歐洲各國反恐及移民政策；促使極右派政黨在若干國家議會及歐洲議會獲得席位，危及歐盟民主國家的政治秩序。

關鍵詞：數位政治、數位民粹主義、網路民粹主義、數位公民精神、英格蘭防衛同盟

### 壹、前言

數位政治(digital politics)或網路政治(internet politics)或數位時代的政治(politics in the digital era)已經成為當代政治學、政治分析或政治實務的流行詞彙，尤其在政治實務上，運用數位科技或資通科技(information and communications technologies)作為政治人物與民眾參與政治的溝通及動員的工具，已經是數位時代政治活動不可或缺的

關鍵元素。資通科技也引發其與民主政治之間的不安關係，增加數位政治的不確定性。<sup>1</sup>就政治參與及動員而言，政治人物運用臉書、粉絲團、推特、Line 群組等各種社群媒體，甚至成立「網軍」及「小編」專責動員網路「鄉民」或「鐵粉」及指揮「網軍」進行網路攻防，猶如是進行網路戰爭的「網路戰士」一般，而出現「數位政治勞動者」(digital political labor)的稱號。其藉由「極端意識形態」、「假新聞」或「假訊息」動員民眾，皆是以「欺騙的數位政治」(deceptive digital politics)意圖訴諸於「直接民主」，激發民眾脫離「代議政治」的情緒。由是不免產生極端的民眾，而出現「數位民粹主義」(digital populism)，以極端或歧視主義意圖推翻或破壞既有的民主憲政體制。

歐洲民粹極端主義政黨向來就是歐洲政治的黑暗面，無論是（極）右派(far-right or right)民粹政黨<sup>2</sup>或（極）左派(far-left or left)民粹政黨，尤其2010年（極）右派政治領袖個人組成的「歐洲自由聯盟」(European Alliance for Freedom)成立，<sup>3</sup>帶動歐洲（極）右派民粹運動風潮。例如德國極右派粹主義代表—「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世

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1. Benjamin R. Barber, "The Uncertainty of Digital Politics: Democracy's Uneasy Relationship with Information Technology," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 42-47.
  2. 極右派政黨是指政黨右派意識形態及反移民政策，可藉由專家調查(expert survey)操作化意識形態與移民政策，選定歐洲極右派政黨，請見 Joost van Spanje, "The Wrong and the Right: A Comparative Analysis of 'Anti-Immigration' and 'Far Right' Parties," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 2011, pp. 293-320。本文並不刻意區分極右派與右派，主要聚焦於其反菁英、反移民及維持國家文化認同的意識形態。
  3. 政治人物包括奧地利塞巴斯蒂安(Franz Sebastian Obermayr)、英國布盧姆(Godfrey William Bloom)、比利時克萊伊斯(Philip Claeys)、法國勒龐(Marion Anne Perrine "Marine" Le Pen)及馬爾他埃盧爾-邦尼(Sharon Ellul-Bonici)等人，其在歐洲議會的政治團體是「民族與自由歐洲」(Europe of Nations and Freedom)。

界伊斯蘭化」(Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, PEGIDA)及英國極右派民粹主義代表－「英格蘭防衛同盟」(the English Defence League)。

2010-2011年(極)右派民粹政黨在國家與地方層級選舉獲得重大突破，顯示出民眾對其支持增長中，遂成為歐洲社會、主要政黨及歐洲整合的嚴峻挑戰。<sup>4</sup>尤其是歐洲議會(European Parliament)議員選舉更是觀察民粹主義整體政治勢力的關鍵及平臺，2014年歐洲議會議員選舉，歐洲各國的右派民粹主義政黨及政團<sup>5</sup>獲得「席捲」及「地震」般的結果，比2009年增加15席，獲得52席，足以對抗歐洲議會的主流政黨集團。<sup>6</sup>這是導因於歐盟長期忽略統合過程中所產生的分配正義與公平的議題，再加上歐債危機的不當治理之後變得更為惡化。<sup>7</sup>自

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4. Goodwin Matthew, David Cutts, & Laurence Janta-Lipinski, "Economic Losers, Protestors, Islamophobes or Xenophobes? Predicting Public Support for a Counter-Jihad Movement," *Political Studies*, Vol. 64, No. 1, September 2014, pp. 4-26.

5. 主要是指「自由與直接民主歐洲」(Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy)及「民族與自由歐洲」政治團體，其獲得歐洲多國右派政黨的支持，例如法國「國家陣線」(National Front)、荷蘭「自由黨」(Party for Freedom)、比利時荷蘭語區「佛拉芒利益黨」(Vlaams Belang)、「奧地利自由黨」(the Freedom Party of Austria)、「瑞典民主黨」(the Sweden Democrats)、「斯洛伐克民族黨」(the Slovak National Party)及義大利「北方聯盟」(Northern League)。

6. Cas Mudde, "The Far Right in the 2014 European Elections: Of Earthquakes, Cartels and Designer Fascists," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 2014, <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-of-earthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/?no-redirect=on>>.

7. 羅至美，〈民粹右翼政黨於2014年歐洲議會選舉的興起與對歐洲統合的意涵〉，《理論與政策》，第19卷第1期，2016年8月，頁29-64。

此，右派民粹主義在各國的政治影響力驟增，反對民粹主義的學者赫特勒(Isabelle Hertner)就認為，2019年歐洲議會選舉是歐洲各國能否抵擋民粹主義浪潮的關鍵，要政治人物、記者及一般民眾共同對抗。<sup>8</sup>簡言之，即是檢驗極右派勢力的關鍵時刻，因為在選舉前，主要的極右派團體領導者就已經表明要共組「歐洲人民與民族聯盟」(European Alliance of Peoples and Nations)改變歐盟整合及移民政策。<sup>9</sup>2019年5月，歐洲議會議員選舉結果，極右派民粹主義政黨及政團獲得119席，<sup>10</sup>約占15.84%席位，<sup>11</sup>勢力大增足以影響議會運作。這樣的結果主要是與因全球化擴展、金融危機及移民問題，推卸(shifts)本身的責任並轉嫁他者(othering)，引發激進保守主義的新右派(New Right)民粹運動興起有關。<sup>12</sup>

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8. Isabelle Hertner, "Can Populists Win the 2019 European Parliamentary Elections? How to Stem the Populist Tide?," *Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper*, No. 18/06, December 2018, *Cicero Foundation*, <[http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Isabelle\\_Hertner\\_Populists\\_and\\_European\\_Elections.pdf](http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Isabelle_Hertner_Populists_and_European_Elections.pdf)>.

9. Jen Kirby, "This Week's European Parliament Elections Will Test the Strength of Far-Right Populism," *Vox*, May 22, 2019, <<https://www.vox.com/2019/5/22/18526967/european-parliament-elections-2019-salvini-le-pen>>.

10. 「自由與直接民主歐洲」(Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy)並未登記參加選舉，「民族與自由歐洲」(Europe of Nations and Freedom)改組為「認同與民主」(Identity and Democracy)獲得73席，較2014年增加19席；另外(極)右派政黨團體，「脫歐黨」(The Brexit Party)獲得30席，「歐洲和平與民主聯盟」(The European Alliance for Peace and Democracy)獲得2席，「五星運動」(Five Star Movement)獲得14席，但都不屬於歐洲議會政黨而是歸類於「無所屬議員」(Non-Inscrits)。

11. Jen Kirby, "This Week's European Parliament Elections Will Test the Strength of Far-Right Populism."

12. Thomas Greven, *The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective* (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2016), pp. 2-4; Birte Siim & Sui Meret, "Right-Wing Populism in Denmark: People,

更重要地是，不同於傳統的民粹主義運動，數位科技促使民粹主義團體或人物得以迅速傳遞信念及訊息，動員及組織群眾展現其影響力，進入數位民粹主義的時代。當代激進保守主義得以運用數位科技傳遞極端右派或新右派的意識形態，促使歐洲民粹主義運動加速發展而衝擊該地區及國家的政治發展。

本文的目的即在於藉由民粹主義理論論述當代數位民粹主義的特質及其運作方式，並以英國極右派組織「英格蘭防衛同盟」為例，說明數位民粹主義藉由數位科技宣傳意識形態及動員民眾，進行反伊斯蘭的示威抗議遊行活動，造成英國國內的政治社會暴力衝突。英國在2020年1月31日深夜23時，極右派組織無不興高采烈地慶祝正式脫歐。這在某種程度上，也證明了數位民粹主義對於民主國家國內政治與國際政治的影響，未來的談判過程中，即使「英格蘭防衛同盟」已經逐漸沒落，但數位民粹主義在言論自由及表意自由的民主憲政基礎上，只要其言論及行為不違法，就獲得國家法律保障與保護，仍是影響英國脫歐談判結果的力量之一，也將影響歐洲及國際世界的秩序。

## 貳、數位時代的民粹主義－數位民粹主義的特質與運作

民粹主義始於19世紀俄羅斯的「農民運動」(Narodniki)及美國的「人民黨」(the People's Party)，逐漸擴展至歐洲及拉丁美洲等地。<sup>13</sup>

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Nation, and Welfare in the Construction of ‘Others, ’” in Gabriella Lazaridis, Giovanna Campani, & Annie Benveniste, eds., *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populists Shifts and ‘Othering’* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 109-136.

<sup>13</sup> Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, & Pierre Ostiguy, “Introduction: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art,” in Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, & Pierre Ostiguy, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 3-4.

其定義與樣貌就像是變色龍，不同的國家因其歷史、結構、意識形態、組織化及制度化程度而有所不同。<sup>14</sup>民粹主義是有政治爭議的概念，歷史社會條件不同，也就有不同的看法；民粹主義的邏輯是由批判道德腐敗的菁英（唯有人民道德高尚）、反對社會多元主義（主張同質的社會）、排他性的認同政治（唯有其代表整體人民），所組成的政治道德想像。<sup>15</sup>民粹主義者運用傳播媒體與社會抗議活動宣傳及動員群眾，以反抗或推翻既有體制而實踐其意識形態。民粹主義是代議民主政治的危機，是民主政治大轉型的症候群，是民主政治正當性危機的症候群。<sup>16</sup>不免質疑民粹主義是民主政治的私生子還是孿生子？<sup>17</sup>

#### 一、民主政治與民粹主義的一體兩面

有民主政治就有民粹主義，民主政治幾乎不可能沒有民粹主義，民粹主義既是民主政治的威脅也是轉機，而沒有民主政治的民粹主義

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14. Dietmar Loch, "Populism and the Radical Right in Europe: The Paradigmatic Case of the French Front National," in Gregor Fitzi, Jurgen Mackert, & Bryan S. Turner, eds., *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy Vol. 2, Politics, Social Movement and Extremism* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 85-87.

15. Jan-Werner Muller, *What Is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), pp. 1-6, 18-19.

16. Alberto Martinelli, "Populism and the Crisis of Representative Democracy," in Alberto Martinelli, ed., *Populism on the Rise: Democracy under Challenge?* (Milano: Ledizioni Ledi Publishing, 2016), pp. 13-31; Gregor Fitzi, "Introduction: Political Populism as a Symptom of the Great Transformation of Democracy," in Gregor Fitzi, Jurgen Mackert, & Bryan S. Turner, eds., *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy Vol. 2, Politics, Social Movement and Extremism* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 1-10.

17. Jose Filipe Pinto, "Populism, Is It Democracy's Bastard or Twin? The Case of the European Union," *Chinese Political Science Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 2017, pp. 328-344.

不是必然，但卻是可能，<sup>18</sup>即是出現暴民政治(ochlocracy or mobocracy)。民粹主義與民主政治呈現出銅板的兩面，都必須涉及「主權人民」才能生存。<sup>19</sup>簡言之，當民粹主義政黨經由民主政治選舉掌握政權時，其是否會遵守民主憲政程序以維持民主政治的運作？若遵守民主憲政制度限制，就會是民主政治的再興；若不遵守，就會是民主政治的病態。<sup>20</sup>民粹主義政黨掌權拒絕遵守民主憲政限制，反對權力制衡的制度結構，遂徹底地改造憲政制度，建立民粹主義領導者與人民之間的關聯，即是所謂的「憲政民粹主義」(constitutional populism)。<sup>21</sup>甚至可能推翻既有的政黨體制，直接訴諸人民而無須代議民主政治，造成政治的極化<sup>22</sup>或使得民粹主義與主權主義(sovereignism)結合成「民粹主權主義」(populist sovereignism or PopSovism)的興起，即是訴諸於人民保護各自國家的主權，反對全球化及政治整合的過程與結果，而對國際安全及防衛產生衝擊。<sup>23</sup>

民粹主義既是民主政治的威脅也是矯正(corrective)，<sup>24</sup>實是兩面

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18. Jose Filipe Pinto, "Populism, Is It Democracy's Bastard or Twin? The Case of the European Union," pp. 328-344.

19. Gregor Fitz, "Introduction: Political Populism as a Symptom of the Great Transformation of Democracy," pp. 1-10.

20. Tjitske Akkerman, "Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology?" *Acta Politica*, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 147-159.

21. Manuel Anselmi, *Populism: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 87-90.

22. Takis S. Pappas, "Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and Post-Communist Hungary," *Opposition and Government*, Vol. 49, No. 1, January 2014, pp. 1-23.

23. Stephan De Spiegeleire, Clarissa Skinner, & Tim Sweijjs, *The Rise of Populist Sovereignism: What It Is, Where It Comes From, and What It Means for International Security and Defense* (Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017), pp. 23-41.

刃。但學者對於民粹主義的定義與運用沒有一致的意見，各有各的主張及運用方式。<sup>25</sup>其分別認為民粹主義是領導者組織群眾及尋求權力的策略或方式、<sup>26</sup>政治溝通方式、<sup>27</sup>意識形態<sup>28</sup>、心態，<sup>29</sup>其是具有多樣

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24. Cas Mudde & Cristobal R. Kaltwasser, "Populism: Corrective and Threat to Democracy," in Cas Mudde & Cristobal R. Kaltwasser, eds., *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 205-222.
25. Stijn van Kessel, "The Populist Cat-Dog: Applying the Concept of Populism to Contemporary European Party System," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 2014, pp. 99-118.
26. K. Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American politics," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, October 2011, p. 14; Hans-Georg Betz, "Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies," in Yevs Mény & Yevs Surel, eds., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 198.
27. Jan Jagers & Steffan Walgrave, "Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Partys' Discourse in Belgium," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 46, No. 3, April 2007, pp. 319-345; Claes de Vreese, Frank Esser, Toril Aalberg, Carsten Reinemann, & James Stanyer, "Populism as an Expression of Political Communication Content and Style: A New Perspective," *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 4, October 2018, pp. 423-438.
28. Margaret Canovan, "Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy," in Yves Mény and Yves Surel, eds., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 25-44; Daniel Sandru, "The Ideological Components of Populism," in Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu, & Sorina Soare, eds., *Contemporary Populism. A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 53-83.
29. Juan Linz, *Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,



但非全然差異的許多面貌。<sup>30</sup> 例如柏林(Isaiah Berlin)就以「灰姑娘情結」(Cinderella Complex)隱喻定義民粹主義的困難，民粹主義就像是灰姑娘故事中的玻璃鞋，學者就像是王子拿著鞋子四處尋找完全符合的人，只有某個人的腳可以完全符合，但永遠找不到這個人，反而有許多人的腳是差不多符合，不應該困在其中，堅持一定要找完全符合的人。<sup>31</sup> 查爾奇(Marco Tarchi)就試著教導學者將民粹主義視為是極端形式的民主政治光譜(spectrum)而非反民主陰影(shadow)，以不同於威權主義心態的民粹主義心態擺脫此情結，即盡其可能維護人民最多的權力。<sup>32</sup> 吉瑞歐迪(Giorgio C. S. Giraudi)也認為要以多層面綜合途徑了解民粹主義，並連結民粹主義與民主政治理論之間共通的規範基礎。<sup>33</sup>

然而，民粹主義是爭論的、變化無常的、受文化限制的及因環境背景而有不同的。<sup>34</sup> 無論何種樣貌的民粹主義，領導者是民粹主義與運

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2000), pp. 162-164; Ghiță Ionescu, & Ernest Gellner, "Introduction," in Ghiță Ionescu & Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 1-4.

30. Dwayne Woods, "The Many Faces of Populism: Diverse but not Disparate," in Dwayne Woods & Barbara Wejnert, eds., *The Many Faces of Populism: Current Perspectives* (Brigley: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd., 2014), pp. 1-25.

31. Isaiah Berlin, "To Define Populism," *Government and Oppositions*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1968, pp. 137-180.

32. Marco Tarchi, "Populism and Political Science: How to Get Rid of the 'Cinderella Complex,'" in Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mișcoiu, & Sorina Soare, eds., *Contemporary Populism. A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 114-137.

33. Giorgio C. S. Giraudi, "Populism: What Is and Why We Need A Multidimensional Approach to Understand It," *European Scientific Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 8, March 2018, pp. 16-29.

34. David Arter, "The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical

動的關鍵角色，其組織及動員群眾進行抗議與抵制既有體制的運動。<sup>35</sup> 穆勒(Jan-Werner Muller)歸結民粹主義的七項論點，第一，「民粹主義既不是當代民主政治的真實部分，也不是不理性公民造成的民主政治病態，而是代議政治造成的永遠陰影」；第二，「批評菁英的人不一定是民粹主義者，其還要是反(社會)多元主義者(antipluralist)」；第三，「民粹主義者宣稱其代表人民意願的共同利益，但卻不重視人民意願的形成過程，或從一般具有常識的人匯集共同利益」；第四，「民粹主義者要求公投，但只是要確認由其早已決定真正人民所應有的利益，所以民粹主義不是促進更多政治參與的方式」；第五，「民粹主義者認為只有其代表人民而治理，遂無所不為」；第六，「民粹主義者應該為其危及民主政治的行為而遭受批判」；第七，「民粹主義不是在矯正自由民主政治使其接近人民或是再顯人民主權，而是迫使自由民主政治的保護者深思與矯正代議制的缺失」。<sup>36</sup> 這七項論點是在觀察民粹政治現象時，需要做為圭臬的依據，藉以區別民主政治與民粹政治的差異，但兩者就像孿生兄弟也不是那麼容易區分，只能多觀察及多接觸，才能區分人民、民主與民粹的差異。<sup>37</sup>

簡言之，人民主權是當代政治論述與治理的正當性基礎，人民是最重要的政治主體，民主政治與民粹主義是人民主權的善惡兩面，兩者的善惡之分，在於是否依據既存的憲政法制規範動員人民獲取政

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Right Party? The Case of the True Finns,” *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 45, No. 4, October 2010, p. 490.

35. Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 51-69.

36. Jan-Werner Muller, *What Is Populism?* pp. 101-103.

37. 尤其是左派思想家或激進民主政治理論學者認為所有的政治活動都是程度不等的民粹運動，人民作為政治主體，人民如何符應民主精神與平等原則，請見林淑芬，〈「人民」做主？民粹主義、民主與人民〉，《政治與社會哲學評論》，第12期，2005年3月，頁141-182。

權，民主政治是依據憲政法制規範行使人民權利，民粹主義則是依附卻又要推翻憲政法制規範。

## 二、民粹主義的數位化、極端化與暴力攻擊：數位科技與極端思想的領導者

網際網路促進政治權力分散、增加政治參與、建立政治社群、加速全球化、轉變後工業化社會價值、合理化政治趨勢、強化政治治理與自由主義。<sup>38</sup>但網際網路容易使用、管制有限、擁有廣大的閱聽眾、能夠匿名與相同想法的個人溝通、具有多重媒體的環境，以及形塑傳統大眾媒介所能涵蓋的範圍等特性，遂成為極端主義團體廣為使用的工具。<sup>39</sup>尤其數位科技促進民粹主義的興起，無論是藉由傳統媒體或社群媒體，使民粹主義的政治傳播、動員及招募更為容易及迅速，其可見度、真實性及效能更高，<sup>40</sup>引起學者憂慮隨著數位民粹主義興起，民主政治將遭致挑戰。<sup>41</sup>特別是當民粹主義執政黨以民族主義作為其意識形態時，更是令學者憂慮民主政治的存亡。<sup>42</sup>尤其極端主義與民粹主義團體運用社群媒體傳播仇恨及恐懼，分享政治觀點，引起同溫

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38. Andrew Chadwick, *Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-16.

39. Chris W. Hale, "Extremism on the World Wide Web: A Research Review," *Criminal Justice Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4, March 2012, pp. 343-356.

40. Lone Sorensen, "Populist Communication in the New Media -Environment: A Cross-Regional Comparative Perspective," *Palgrave Communications*, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2018, pp. 1-12.

41. Alberto Martinelli, "Populism and Crisis of Representative Democracy," pp. 13-31.

42. Alberto Martinelli, "Populism & Nationalism: The (Peculiar) Case of Italy," in Alberto Martinelli, ed., *When Populism Meets Nationalism: Reflections on Parties in Power* (Milano: Ledizioni Ledi Publishing, 2018), pp. 13-45.

層的相同共鳴效應，乃至相互結為網絡，形成集體認同擴展影響力，<sup>43</sup>進而激化原有觀點而成為極端主義。<sup>44</sup>甚至作為招募年輕志工或成員的有效管道，利於運動與組織的發展。<sup>45</sup>

隨著數位科技發展而出現數位時代，但網際網路並未創造團結的地球村社群，反而是分裂成「網路巴爾幹半島」(cyberbalkans)，各有不同利益的群體，各自運用網際網路吸引或閱讀相同意見的成員。<sup>46</sup>「網路巴爾幹化」(cyberbalkanization)正說明了民粹主義者運用數位科技與社群媒體（例如臉書、粉絲團、推特、Youtube、Line 群組）傳達其意識形態、動員群眾及招募志工，而轉型為「數位民粹主義者」(digital populists)、「網路線上民粹主義者」(online populists)或「社群媒

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43. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Diana R. Grant, & Chau-Pu Chiang, "Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites," *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 1, December 2003, pp. 29-44; Eszter Hargittai, Gallo Jason, & Matthew Kane, "Cross-Ideological Discussions Among Conservative and Liberal Bloggers," *Public Choice*, Vol. 134, No. 1-2, January 2008, pp. 67-86.

44. R. Peter Neumann, "Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 36, No. 6, May 2013, pp. 431-459; Kieron O'Hara & David Stevens, "Echo Chambers and Online Radicalism: Assessing the Internet's Complicity in Violent Extremism," *Policy and Internet*, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2015, pp. 401-422.

45. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Diana R. Grant, & Chau-Pu Chiang, "Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites," pp. 29-44; Val Burris, Emery Smithand, & Ann Strahm, "White Supremacist Networks on the Internet," *Sociological Focus*, Vol. 33, No. 2, May 2000, pp. 215-235.

46. Marshall Van Alstyne & Erik Brynjolfsson, "Global Village or Cyber-Balkans? Modeling and Measuring the Integration Electronic Communities," *Management Science*, Vol. 51, No. 6, June 2005, pp. 851-868.

體民粹主義者」(social media populists)，衝擊了國際民主政治的穩定秩序。盧恩希曼(David Runciman)就呼籲要「拯救網際網路時代的民主政治」；<sup>47</sup>皮爾斯利(Nathaniel Persily)觀察 2016 年美國總統選舉活動之後，就質疑「民主政治能倖存於網際網路嗎？」。<sup>48</sup>

有些學者將當前激進右派民粹主義稱為「新民粹主義」(neo-populism or new populism)，<sup>49</sup>或是反叛自由民主政治的「民族民粹主義」(National Populism)；<sup>50</sup>甚至有學者認為當前的民粹主義正是 1970 年代第三波民主化所帶來的必然結果，是民主化的復仇者，產生自由民主政權與民粹政權的混成(hybridization)。<sup>51</sup>遂有學者稱之為「數位民粹主義」(digital populism)或「網路民粹主義」(cyber-populism)，<sup>52</sup>運用社群媒體或資通科技發展的民粹主義或可稱為「2.0 版民粹主義」

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47. David Runciman, "Rescuing Democracy in the Age of the Internet," *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 3, Fall 2015, pp. 331-344.

48. Nathaniel Persily, "Can Democracy Survive the Internet?" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2017, pp. 63-76.

49. Hans-Georg Betz, "Introduction," in Hans-Georg Betz & Stefan Immerfall, eds., *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in the Established Democracies* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 1-10; Paul Taggart, *Populism* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), pp. 10-22.

50. 即是 4Ds 的民族民粹主義，包括對自由民主政治的既有政治菁英不信任感(Distrust)增加，對國家社群及當地社群既有認同感的毀滅(Destruction)之憂慮增加，對新自由經濟產生的不平等所產生的未來相對剝奪感(Deprivation)及憂慮增加，以及個人認同與主流政黨之間的解組(Dealignment)增加，遂產生強調民族主義的民粹運動。Roger Eatwell & Matthew Goodwin, *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy* (London: Pelican, 2018), pp. 12-16。

51. Enrique Peruzzotti, "Populism as Democratization's Nemesis: The Politics of Regime Hybridization," *Chinese Political Science Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 2017, pp. 314-327.

(populism 2.0)<sup>53</sup>或是「科技民粹主義」(technopopulism)，但其主張藉由資通科技建立透明公開的網際網路之網絡政治參與，完全實踐民有、民治及民享的民主政治而非民粹政治。<sup>54</sup>

極端化的民粹主義團體或運動常以反菁英、民族主義的論述推崇一般人民，強調人民是國家民族的核心，菁英是政治或經濟的統治階層，並且不正當、不正義地統治一般人民；<sup>55</sup>或是以反某種特定議題（如全球化、區域整合）、現象（移民、犯罪）或團體（如宗教、性別、少數族裔）為其論述或敘事的內容。<sup>56</sup>數位民粹主義團體或運動更善於運用跨媒體(transmedia)或多媒體(multimedia)的論述或敘事內容，傳達其主張及論點來說服及動員閱聽眾，透過網際網路及社群媒體採取集體行動(collective action)與相關聯行動(connective action)，尤其相關聯行動是藉由社群媒體（臉書、推特及Youtube）組織閱聽眾自願自動(self-motivated)參與行動，參與者更能自我表達立場而自我組織成

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52. Paolo Gerbaudo, "Populism 2.0: Social media Activism, the Generic Internet User and Interactive Direct Democracy," in Christian Fuchs & Daniel Trotter, eds., *Social Media, Politics and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2014), pp. 67-87.

53. Benjamin Moffitt, "Populism 2.0 Social Media and the False Allure of 'Unmediated' Representation," in Gregor Fitzzi, Jurgen Mackert, & Bryan S. Turner, eds., *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy Vol. 2, Politics, Social Movement and Extremism* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 30-46.

54. Marco Deseriis, "Technopopulism: The Emergence of a Discursive Formation," *TripleC*, Vol. 15, No. 2, May 2017, pp. 441-458.

55. Robert S. Jansen, "Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism," *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2011, pp. 75-96.

56. Stephan Mergenthaler, *Countering Populist Mobilization: Response Strategies for the Political Mainstream* (Budapest: School of Public Policy, Central European University, 2015), pp. 7-8.

社會網絡行動。<sup>57</sup> 終究一般民眾在社群媒體所接受到的民粹主義訊息，影響著其對民粹主義的態度。<sup>58</sup> 例如運用「主題標籤」(hashtag)傳播「#殺死所有的穆斯林」(#KillAllMuslims)、「歡迎強暴犯難民」(#Rape-refugeesWelcome)或以「#沛可夢」(#Pakemon)<sup>59</sup> 煽動反穆斯林活動。<sup>60</sup> 極端民粹主義反對與抗拒社會的多元性，運用網際網路媒體傳播極端的、恐懼的、仇恨的、敵視的觀點，民眾接觸民粹主義的網際網路訊息與其參與實際政治活動（例如投票、加入政黨及參加示威）有所關聯，這是數位民粹主義的新面貌。<sup>61</sup> 數位民粹主義加速了民粹主義極端化，將其不滿與失望歸罪於其他人，甚至採取暴力的方式示威、攻擊不同立場的個人或團體，促使其成為恐怖主義份子，尤其極右派的民粹主義也是恐怖攻擊的來源，促進極右派恐怖主義的蔓延。<sup>62</sup>

即使是數位民粹主義，依然需要具有魅力的領導者，運用社群媒體平臺個人化其魅力權威(individualized charismatic authority)，吸引民眾的熱誠情感參與組織活動。<sup>63</sup> 尤其有魅力的領導者其論述、敘述的

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57. Lance W. Bennett & Alexandra Segerberg, "The Logic of Connective Action," *Information, Communication and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 5, June 2012, pp. 739-768.

58. Michael Hameleers & Desiree Schmuck, "It's US Against Them: A Comparative Experiment on the Effects of Populist Messages Communicated via Social Media," *Information, Communication and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 9, May 2017, pp. 1425-1444.

59. 沛可夢(Pakemon)是將寶可夢抓寶遊戲(Pokemon)與巴基斯坦伊斯蘭共和國(Pakistan)兩字分取字首字尾而成。

60. Tell Mama, *A Constructed Threat: Identity, Prejudice, and the Impact of Anti-Muslim Hatred* (London: Faith Matters, 2017), pp. 70-72.

61. Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, & Mark Littler, *The New Face of Digital Populism* (London: Demos, 2011), pp. 15-23.

62. 林子立，〈歐洲右派恐怖攻擊與民粹主義〉，《歐亞研究》，第9期，2019年10月，頁91-99。

溝通方式大多是簡單明瞭、直率的及挑釁的，藉以產生閱聽眾認同連結弱勢民眾，以脫離菁英及既有體制；<sup>64</sup>簡言之，就是根據不同的溝通目的，而訴諸於不同的情感（例如希望、榮耀、憤怒與恐懼）訊息之溝通方式。<sup>65</sup>無論是左派或右派民粹主義，領導者常是決定民粹主義走向極端化、暴力化與恐怖化的關鍵因素。

2008-2018年間，無論是極右派或極左派的極端主義在英美兩國臉書上引起爭論頁面的數量及參與人數均持續增加，即使2017-2018年間有所減緩；2012-2016年間，即使有些極右派粉絲團頁面被放棄或被刪除，臉書上引起爭論的頁面主要還是極右派超越極左派。<sup>66</sup>2015年歐洲民粹主義政黨更是經由選舉建立起「民粹主義者鐵幕」(populist iron curtain)，左派民粹主義在地中海興起（義大利除外），右派民粹主義在西歐及東歐強盛。<sup>67</sup>

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63. Nils Gustafsson & Noomi Weinryb, "The Populist Allure of Social Media Activism: Individualized Charismatic Authority," *Organization*, Vol. 27, No. 3, May 2020, pp. 431-440.

64. Elena Block & Ralph Negrine, "The Populist Communication Style: Toward a Critical Framework," *International Journal of Communication*, Vol. 11, December 2017, pp. 178-197.

65. Dominique S. Wirz, "Persuasion Through Emotion? An Experimental Test of the Emotion-Eliciting Nature of Populist Communication," *International Journal of Communication*, Vol. 12, December 2018, pp. 1114-1138.

66. Varpu Rantala & Steve El-Sharawy, "Is Facebook Cracking Down on Right Wing Pages?" *EzyInsights Research Report*, May 2018, *ezyinsights*, <<https://ezyinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/is-fb-cracking-down-web.pdf>>.

67. Andras Biro-Nagy, Tamas Boros, & Tibor Kadlot, *The State of Populism in Europe* (Budapest: Policy Solution, 2015), p. 7.



### 三、極右派民粹主義的德國代表—「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」

「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動源於德國德勒斯登市(Dresden)公關公司員工巴赫曼(Lutz Bachmann)與友人籌畫於2014年10月13日起，每周星期一舉行「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」示威活動，抗議聯邦政府在該市增設14所難民中心，並呼籲制定更嚴格的移民規定，以保護德國及歐洲社會的猶太教及基督教文化。11月14日，成立「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」社團(association)，並於12月9日，依法向該市登記為社團，選舉巴赫曼為主席。<sup>68</sup>12月10日，經由臉書發布一篇〈立場文告〉(position paper)陳述其19項關鍵主張，其中1-14項是支持德國接納戰爭、政治及宗教難民的人道責任，並由歐洲所有國家負責分散安置難民，降低每位社福人員服務難民的比率，簡化庇護申請程序，增加警察資源，執行既有的難民庇護及驅逐出境法令，絕不容忍難民或移民犯罪，抗拒憎恨、暴力的政治意識形態（不包括居住在德國而願意整合的穆斯林），瑞士、澳洲、加拿大、南非等國的移民政策模式，性自主、保留及保護西方文化的猶太基督教特質，瑞士式的公民複決；15-19項是反對運送武器給反憲法或不合憲法的組織（庫德族工人黨），反對容忍平行共存的社會、法庭及法律，反對瘋狂的性別主流化(gender-mainstreaming)或性別化，反對政治與宗教的激進主義，反對仇恨任何宗教的傳教人員。<sup>69</sup>

「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動逐漸從德勒斯登市擴展到德國全國及歐洲其他國家，例如奧地利、比利時、保加利亞、捷

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68. Dieter Rucht, "Pegida & Co. The Rise and Fall of a Populist Enterprise," March 2015, *FES London Office*, <[https://www.fes-london.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/publications/files/FES\\_London\\_Rucht\\_Pegida\\_3\\_2015.pdf](https://www.fes-london.org/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/files/FES_London_Rucht_Pegida_3_2015.pdf)>.

69. PEGIDA, "Position Paper," December 2014, *PEGIDA*, <<https://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf>>.

克、丹麥、法國、義大利、荷蘭、挪威、波蘭、希臘、匈牙利、愛爾蘭、斯洛維尼亞、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、英國，甚至紐西蘭、澳洲、加拿大、美國，持續擴展中。盧恰(Dieter Rucht)就以「『歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化』公司」(Pegida & Co.)稱述此運動，並以民粹企業(a populist enterprise)觀點探索其在國際的擴展與沒落。<sup>70</sup>

「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動組織主要是運用社群媒體溝通、組織及動員其成員及大眾，即使同為「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動組織，以批判移民及穆斯林為主要議題，使用包容語言（如朋友、團結強大）及人民對抗體制的架構建立情感社群，但運用社群媒體的策略與方式則有不同，例如在動員民眾示威上，德國較為積極，奧地利則較為消極；在批判政治人物上，德國較溫和，奧地利則較激烈。<sup>71</sup>但比較奧地利、挪威、瑞典及瑞士四國「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動組織的動員策略（使用PEGIDA名稱街頭示威、反種族團體的反動員行動與網路激進行動）與該國相關的禁令，奧地利與挪威參加街頭示威的人數規模則是較瑞士及瑞典為多。<sup>72</sup>

「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動擴展到歐洲，引起其他不同價值觀的「年輕歐洲聯邦者」(Young European Federalists)組織聯盟發表〈對『歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化』運動在整個歐洲演進的共同聲明〉(A Common Statement on the Evolution of the PEGIDA Movement through Europe)，就〈立場文告〉表達不同的立

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70. Dieter Rucht, "Pegida & Co. The Rise and Fall of a Populist Enterprise."

71. Adre Haller & Kristoffer Holt, "Paradoxical Populism: How PEGIDA Relates to Mainstream and Alternative Media," *Information, Communication & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 12, 2019, pp. 1665-1680.

72. Lars Erik Berntzen & Manès Weisskircher, "Anti-Islamic PEGIDA Beyond Germany: Explaining Differences in Mobilisation," *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 6, October 2016, pp. 556-573.

場，例如界定移民素質的移民法並不符合普遍人權，也不會產生開放、容忍及寬容的歐洲；尊重憲法與法律是基本要求，國家有責任提供所有公民平等的各權利，移民也是公民有自我實踐的權利，以保證開放的社會；擔心西方世界伊斯蘭化而要求更嚴格的移民法規限制，但這也會排除、忽略及汙名化此移民地區的所有人民；民主的歐洲聯邦(federation)是和平與更自由、正義及民主的社會所不可或缺，需要賦予歐洲議會決策權；聯邦各成員國政策部會之間的密切合作，以持續的財務支應保護申根區域外的歐洲疆界。<sup>73</sup>

於是支持與反對「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動的群眾，不時在網際網路、社群媒體、街頭示威活動或日常生活中，產生言語衝突或暴力衝突，迫使歐洲國家相關政府必須投入龐大的人力、物力及財力防止雙方衝突，浪費社會資源。尤其受到「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動影響的群眾或個人涉嫌殺害政治人物，例如 2019 年 7 月 5 日，殺害基督民主聯盟地方政治人物盧貝奇(Walter Lübcke)；<sup>74</sup> 德國警察就調查該運動領導人巴赫曼是否涉嫌以納粹黨口號煽動暴力犯罪。<sup>75</sup> 在此之前，2018 年 3 月一位德國少女被殺的新聞就在網路社群媒體上謠傳是穆斯林移民殺害，巴赫曼也在網路分享流傳，但實際狀況卻不是如此，而是遭友人殺害。<sup>76</sup> 這樣的「假新聞」或

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73. Young European Federalists, “A Common Statement on the Evolution of the PEGIDA Movement through Europe,” March 30, 2015, *Young European Federalists*, <[https://www.jef.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/03/Common\\_Statement\\_on\\_PEGIDA\\_final\\_new.pdf](https://www.jef.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/03/Common_Statement_on_PEGIDA_final_new.pdf)>.

74. “German Police Investigating Far-Right PEGIDA Leader for Incitement to Violence,” October 9, 2019, *DW News*, <<https://m.dw.com/en/german-police-investigating-far-right-pegida-leader-for-incitement-to-violence/a-50760818>>.

75. “Germany: Far-Right Pegida Supporters Probed for Condoning Politician’s Murder,” July 5, 2019, *DW News*, <<https://m.dw.com/en/germany-far-right-pegida-supporters-probed-for-condoning-politicians-murder/a-49492560>>.

「假訊息」不時在網路上流傳，引起不同立場與意見網民的爭論，甚至在街頭示威遊行的對立叫囂抗議或暴力衝突。

#### 四、極右派民粹主義的英國代表—「英格蘭防衛同盟」

尤其訴諸民族主義的極端主義政黨結合成極右派「新民族主義網絡」(Neo-Nationalist Network)，集體進行「反制伊斯蘭聖戰運動」(Counter-Jihad Movement)，<sup>77</sup>動員非伊斯蘭教民眾抗議及反制歐洲「伊斯蘭化」(Islamisation)。<sup>78</sup>其中，由「英國民族黨」(British National Party)支持者雷(Paul Ray)，本名新納托(Paul Cinato)，另有假名「安卓斯」(Paul Andrews)在其成立名為「獅心」(Lionheart)<sup>79</sup>的部落格撰文反伊斯蘭而發展成英式足球暴力團體的「英格蘭防衛同盟」，以及由巴赫曼與友人於2014年成立的「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動，運用網際網路宣傳及動員歐洲民族主義極端人士

76. "How the Far Right Hijacked a Teenager's Murder," March 7, 2019, *BBC News*, <<https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-47390150>>.

77. 伊斯蘭聖戰(Jihad)一詞在阿拉伯文中或可蘭經中，並不代表聖戰(holy war)之意，而是奮鬥(struggle)，大多穆斯林也反對詮釋為聖戰，因為極易造成誤解。Jihad可分外在的小Jihad及內在的大Jihad，前者是抵抗外在敵人，後者是內在自我心靈鍛鍊。請見彭書穎，《超越聖戰：探索伊斯蘭吉哈德》(臺北：風雲論壇社，2014年)，頁33-36。

78. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens & Hans Brun, *A Neo-nationalist Network: The English Defence League and Europe's Counter-jihad Movement* (Försvarshögskolan: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2013), pp. 41-57.

79. 英格蘭國王理查一世(Richard I, 1157-1199)曾加入教廷發起的十字軍東征，英勇驍戰擊敗伊斯蘭教軍隊，而獲「獅心王理查」(Richard The Lionheart)之稱，這說明了雷的意圖及心態。英格蘭國王理查一世(Richard I, 1157-1199)曾加入教廷發起的十字軍東征，驍勇善戰擊敗伊斯蘭教軍隊，而獲「獅心王理查」(Richard The Lionheart)之稱，這說明了雷的意圖及心態。

產生「同溫層（迴聲室或濾泡）效應」(echo chambers or filter bubbles)，<sup>80</sup> 以民粹方式鼓動街頭暴力示威及網路散布極端或仇恨言論，危及國際民主政治秩序。其中「英國民族黨」與「英格蘭防衛同盟」形成陣線聯盟，強調以「英國優先」(British First)抵抗英國與歐洲的伊斯蘭化，<sup>81</sup> 但「英國民族黨」黨員也滲透進入「英格蘭防衛同盟」領導階層，產生權力與路線鬥爭。<sup>82</sup> 易言之，「英格蘭防衛同盟」是一項集體的製造世界之計畫(a collective world-making)。<sup>83</sup> 甚至造成英國脫歐公投前，國家的國際與國內分歧而出現民粹國族主義，以及物資與身分認同的認知分歧而惡性循環。<sup>84</sup>

不同於德國極右派民粹主義的「歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」運動追求聯合歐洲各國的極右派民粹主義抵抗伊斯蘭化，「英格蘭防衛同盟」則僅是追求抵抗英國內部伊斯蘭化，或許可以稱後者是

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80. 迴聲室效應(echo chamber)是基伊(Vladimir O. Key)首先提出，指意見形成過程中，相同意見不斷重複而產生擴大的效應，請見 Vladimir O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 1-2。濾泡效應(filter bubbles)是帕里瑟(Eli Pariser)提出，指網站會針對使用者的搜尋，依據其個人登錄資料、搜尋紀錄或所在位置等個人化資料，而提供經過篩選運算後的搜尋結果內容，請見 Eli Pariser, *The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), p. 9。

81. Chris Allen, "British First: The 'Frontline Resistance' to the Islamification of Britain," *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 85, No. 3, July-September 2014, pp. 354-360.

82. Hsiao-Hung Pai, *Angry White People: Coming Face-to-Face with the British Far Right* (London: Zed Books, 2016), pp. 65-110.

83. Joel Busher, *The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 8.

84. 林子立，〈民粹主義與國家分歧：以英國脫歐為例〉，《歐亞研究》，第10期，2020年1月，頁83-98。

前者在英國的分支。兩者之間是盟友關係，在組織運作及動員群眾等方式上都是相同的，也是相互支援其他歐洲國家的抵抗伊斯蘭化運動，但由於前者是以整個歐洲為範圍，其組織抵制伊斯蘭化運動經驗與資源豐富，後者遂深受前者的影響。甚至 2015 年後者的領導者退出「英格蘭防衛同盟」，另組類似前者的「（英國）歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」(PEGIDA, UK)運動，顯示出兩者的成效差異。

因為「英格蘭防衛同盟」挑戰了英國及其社會融合、公平與平等的價值觀，其反伊斯蘭也意味著「恐懼伊斯蘭」(Islamophobia)文化及穆斯林出現在英國，威脅英國社會的生活方式；其反對穆斯林歸化為英國人，認為伊斯蘭國家是要透過在歐洲移民出生後代及移民遷入歸化占領歐洲而建立「歐阿拉伯洲」(Eurabia)。研究「英格蘭防衛同盟」的發展興衰例證有其重要意涵：第一，該團體迅速崛起的知名度，有助於理解英國種族主義及反移民的情緒；第二，該團體的沒落並未反映右派極端主義的消失，反而促成其他極右派團體成立；第三，該團體的意識形態性質仍有爭論，需要釐清；第四，這類組織可以造成毀壞性的後果，需要研究與預防；最後，事實證明該組織仍有影響力。<sup>85</sup>這也促使學者思考提出策略防止這類極端主義組織活動的復甦。<sup>86</sup>「英格蘭防衛同盟」是影響歐洲民主政治秩序發展的重要極右派組織之一，殊值觀察其發展歷程，以理解當代數位民粹主義的影響力，反思當前民主政治危機與因應之道。

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85. Dominic Alessio & Kristen Meredith, "Blackshirts for the Twenty-First Century? Fascism and the English Defence League," *Social Identities*, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2014, pp. 104-105.

86. Craig, J. J. McCann, *The Prevent Strategy and Right-Wing Extremism: A Case Study of the English Defence League* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 33-62.

## 參、「英格蘭防衛同盟」的崛起、意識形態、運作與沒落

### 一、「英格蘭防衛同盟」的崛起與意識形態

英格蘭盧頓市(Luton)居民雷受到美國史賓塞(Robert Spencer)的部落格「伊斯蘭聖戰監視」(Jihad Watch)及蓋爾(Pamela Geller)的部落格「阿特拉斯擺脫重負」(Atlas Shrugs)反伊斯蘭言論，以及蓋爾於2007年發動阻止在911攻擊事件場地紐約世貿中心大樓遺址附近建立伊斯蘭社區中心所鼓舞，於2007年開始成立其「獅心」部落格，撰寫反伊斯蘭及支持盎格魯薩克遜英國民族黨的言論，並受到蓋爾的注意及協助，甚至雷因教唆種族仇恨而遭到警察逮捕，蓋爾讚揚他是愛國者。<sup>87</sup>

2009年3月10日由極端伊斯蘭團體「伊斯蘭為英國」(Islam4UK)舉行的反戰遊行，其遊行口號侮辱及打斷從阿富汗服役回國的「皇家盎格魯旅」(Royal Anglian Regiment)軍人返鄉遊行；<sup>88</sup>3月28日，前「皇家盎格魯旅」退伍軍人約曼斯(James Yeomans)舉行訴求於「尊敬我們的軍隊」(Respect our Troops)的反制遊行。此遊行訊息經雷在其部落格公告後，引起兩個源自英式足球迷的反伊斯蘭團體「威爾斯防

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87. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens & Hans Brun, *A Neo-nationalist Network: The English Defence League and Europe's Counter-jihad Movement*, pp. 9-11.

88. 例如「盎格魯軍人：巴斯拉城屠夫」(Anglian Soldiers: Butchers of Basra)、「盎格魯軍人：懦夫、兇手、極端份子」(Anglian Soldiers: Cowards, Killers, Extremists)及「英國政府(是)恐怖份子政府」(British Government Terrorist Government)，請見 Jon Garland & James Treadwell, “‘No Surrender to the Taliban’: Football Hooliganism, Islamophobia and the Rise of the English Defence League,” *Papers from the British Criminology Conference*, Vol. 10, 2010, p. 21。

衛同盟」(Welsh Defence League)及「為英格蘭前進」(March for England)的關注及支持，雷擔心這些團體把持遊行，遂取消遊行；4月13日，雷首次參加街頭反伊斯蘭運動，他與「團結盧頓人民」(the United Peoples of Luton)團體領袖羅賓森(Tommy Robinson)<sup>89</sup>兩人領導其他極右派反伊斯蘭移民的團體（包括「為英格蘭前進」）進行街頭抗議；4月23日「聖喬治節」(St. George Day)，<sup>90</sup>他們再次舉行街頭抗議遊行；5月24日，他們與新成立的「團結的盧頓人民」(United People of Luton)、「團結的休閒幫」(Casuals United)及其他反伊斯蘭聖戰活動團體，舉行示威遊行要求警察簽發〈反社會行為命令〉(Anti-Social Behaviour Orders)禁止「伊斯蘭為英國」進入盧頓市中心，遊行結束後，抗議人士與警察爆發衝突及追逐，甚至攻擊南亞移民，遊行領導者被控破壞公共秩序；6月27日，兩人聯合其他反伊斯蘭移民團體成立「英格蘭防衛同盟」，團結全英國反伊斯蘭的團體，由羅賓森擔任主席，雷則成立「聖喬治分部」(St. George Division)；<sup>91</sup>並且在英國

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89. 羅賓森本名是葉克斯類－萊農(Stephen Yaxley-Lennon)，原是當地足球暴民團體「光頭黨」(Men In Gear)成員的名字。直到2014年1月23日，因貸款詐欺判刑18個月而入獄前，他是「英格蘭防衛同盟」的領袖。他父親是英格蘭人，母親是愛爾蘭移民。2004年加入英國民族黨，2005年因為該黨領袖葛瑞萊(Nick Griffin)加入非白人亦可加入的「民族陣線」(National Front)而退黨。請見 Julia Rampen, "How Tommy Robinson Became A Folk Hero for the Global Alt-Right," *New Statesman*, June 27, 2018, <<https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/06/how-tommy-robinson-became-folk-hero-global-alt-right>>。葉克斯類－萊農的化名還有麥克馬斯特(Andrew McMaster)、哈瑞斯(Paul Harris)及金(Wayne King)，為方便撰寫，本文皆以為人所熟悉的羅賓森稱述。

90. 聖喬治是羅馬帝國的軍官，他阻止羅馬皇帝迫害屠殺基督徒，而被教宗封為殉道聖人。英王愛德華三世(Edward III)定其為是英格蘭的守護聖人，聖喬治(紅色)十字架是英格蘭軍隊重要的紋章，英格蘭國旗又稱聖喬治旗為白底紅十字的旗幟，經常作為基督教十字軍的象徵。



若干重要城市舉行街頭示威，「反對所有虔誠的穆斯林」(against all devout Muslims)或是在伊斯蘭團體舉行的遊行中，建立糾察線及挑釁遊行。92 據估計成立不到兩年，就約有 25,000-35,000 位參與成員，最大的示威活動規模約 2,000-3,000 人。93 在既有的足球暴力團體及反伊斯蘭極右派團體支持下，「英格蘭防衛同盟」就能輕易召集超過 1,000 人進行反伊斯蘭的街頭示威及衝突活動，造成當地政府及警察的治安管理難題。94

「英格蘭防衛同盟」成立之初，並無明確的意識形態，只是反制極端伊斯蘭移民不尊重英國社會的傳統與價值，以及憂慮伊斯蘭移民人口數量增加而威脅英國社會秩序。隨著其組織及參與反伊斯蘭遊行活動日增，逐漸發展出其反伊斯蘭及「反制伊斯蘭聖戰」(counter-ji-

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91. 2009 年 9 月，雷移民馬爾他，聖喬治分部脫離總部，羅賓森成為實際的領導者。請見 Nigel Copsey, *The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality* (London: Faith Matters, 2010), p. 13。

92. Chris Allen, "Opposing Islamification or Promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the English Defence League," *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 45, No. 4, September 2011, pp. 279-294; Dominic Alessio & Kristen Meredith, "Blackshirts for the Twenty-First Century? Fascism and the English Defence League," pp. 104-118.

93. Jamie Bartlett & Mark Littler, *Inside the EDL* (London: Demos, 2011), p. 4.

94. Nigel Copsey, *The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality*, p. 29; Joel Busher, *The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League*, p. 18; William Edward Charles Allchorn, *When Anti-Islamic Protest Comes to Town: Political Responses to the English Defence League* (PhD Thesis, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, 2016), p. 151, *whiterose etheses*, <[http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15938/1/Allchorn\\_W\\_When%20Anti%20Islamic%20Protest%20Comes%20to%20Town%20Political%20Responses%20to%20the%20English%20Defence%20League.pdf](http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15938/1/Allchorn_W_When%20Anti%20Islamic%20Protest%20Comes%20to%20Town%20Political%20Responses%20to%20the%20English%20Defence%20League.pdf)>.

had)的意識形態。「英格蘭防衛同盟」宣稱其只反對伊斯蘭極端主義者而非一般的穆斯林，但後來還是混淆兩者而成反伊斯蘭的意識形態。<sup>95</sup>「英格蘭防衛同盟」以寬容及進步的西方文化與不寬容及落後的伊斯蘭文化的對立觀點，認為伊斯蘭文化不相容於歐洲（英國）社會，甚至威脅到歐洲社會及文化。<sup>96</sup>即使其主張英國多元種族，但穆斯林卻不屬於其中，尤其伊斯蘭仇視西方文化及非穆斯林（如猶太人或基督徒），壓迫女性與同性戀，又與恐怖主義暴力及不民主有關聯，穆斯林不是真正的英國人，需要將穆斯林排除於英國社會之外。<sup>97</sup>遑論穆斯林移民涉及毒品幫派，享有英國的住宅及社會福利，卻並未先行付出該有的稅賦，甚至穆斯林移民商店老闆抬高售價及逃稅，聯合打壓當地英國人商店。<sup>98</sup>簡言之，「英格蘭防衛同盟」之所以反伊斯蘭及穆斯林，是因為伊斯蘭文化不相容於英國文化，穆斯林移民是英國社會秩序的威脅，藉此訴諸於英國人民的反伊斯蘭情緒。

「反制伊斯蘭聖戰」是911恐怖攻擊事件後，歐美國家的民族主義人士（包括政治人物、學者及宗教人士等等）認為伊斯蘭國家與西方

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95. Hilary Pilkington, *Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 101-105.

96. Andrew Brindle, "Cancer has Nothing on Islam: A Study of Discourse by Group Elite and Supporters of the English Defence League," *Critical Discourse Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4, March 2016, pp. 444-459.

97. Jon Garland & James Treadwell, "'No Surrender to the Taliban': Football Hooliganism, Islamophobia and the Rise of the English Defence League," pp. 19-35; Andrew Brindle, "Cancer has Nothing on Islam: A Study of Discourse by Group Elite and Supporters of the English Defence League," p. 457.

98. Simon Winlow, Steve Hall, & James Treadwell, *The Rise of the Right: English Nationalism and the Transformation of Working-Class Politics* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2017), pp. 155-163; Hilary Pilkington, *Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League*, pp. 133-141.

民主國家之間已經開始另一場伊斯蘭與西方基督教文明之間的聖戰。這是「英格蘭防衛同盟」另一重要的意識形態，其是「歐洲反制伊斯蘭聖戰運動」(the European Counter-Jihad Movement)國際聯盟的重要成員及領導團體，羅賓森也是其中的搖滾巨星(rock star)之一；此運動是具有文化民族主義、法西斯主義、民粹主義及極右派色彩的運動，目的在防止歐洲的伊斯蘭化趨勢，例如歐洲政治人物為避免激怒伊斯蘭人民而移除公共場所的基督教或猶太教的象徵，強加伊斯蘭傳統於非伊斯蘭社會，以及在西方社會建立非穆斯林勿入的「禁區」，讓穆斯林人民在禁區內執行伊斯蘭法令，隨著穆斯林移民及其後代的生育率高於非穆斯林而使穆斯林人口數量增加，影響當地的政治、社會、文化與經濟，甚至建立「歐阿拉伯洲」。<sup>99</sup>

「英格蘭防衛同盟」遂以反伊斯蘭及「反制伊斯蘭聖戰」的意識形態動員民眾及組合意識同盟團體，以及連結歐洲其他國家的極右派團體，藉由正式組織運用社群媒體與數位媒體宣傳其意識形態，動員民眾參加街頭示威遊行施壓當地政府與伊斯蘭團體，推動「反制伊斯蘭聖戰運動」。自此，「英格蘭防衛同盟」也就成為主張排他性（排除伊斯蘭及穆斯林）的民粹主義，隨著其組織擴大與運用數位媒體及網際網路傳播排他思想，以暴力方式示威及攻擊反對人士而成為英國官方認定的恐怖主義份子。

## 二、「英格蘭防衛同盟」的組織運作

「英格蘭防衛同盟」成立後，其與分部之間主要是以臉書([www.facebook.com/englishdefenceleagueofficialmainpage](http://www.facebook.com/englishdefenceleagueofficialmainpage))、網頁([www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk](http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk))、Gab社群媒體(<https://gab.ai/EDLmedia>)、推特([twitter.com/EDLofficialpage](https://twitter.com/EDLofficialpage))及YouTube為運作方式，傳遞其意識形

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<sup>99</sup> Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens & Hans Brun, *A Neo-nationalist Network: The English Defence League and Europe's Counter-jihad Movement*, pp.45-47.

態及言論，例如其任務是領導與激發對全球伊斯蘭化的鬥爭、代表人權、代表民主與法治、教育英國公眾了解伊斯蘭、尊重英國傳統、其展望是國際的；<sup>100</sup> 並自認是「致力於拯救國家免於穆斯林極端份子及其推動者危害的人權組織」、「防衛英國文化、傳統及子孫免於伊斯蘭化的攻擊」；<sup>101</sup> 並輔以當地的分部，例如青年分部、婦女分部及特殊利益分部（如同性戀、猶太人、被起訴的基督徒等等）。隨著當地分部擴展，就設立區域鬆散的組織協調架構，<sup>102</sup> 甚至各分部也不知道其所屬的區域組織及協調者，<sup>103</sup> 成員輕易加入或退出組織及活動。<sup>104</sup> 在進行街頭示威遊行時，「英格蘭防衛同盟」有其街頭遊行制服，雖沒有臂章，但支持者可以在其網站購置腕帶、短袖圓領襯衫及帽衫，甚至臉上會帶著「聖喬治」(St. George)面具遮住臉，這些東西都會有「英格蘭防衛同盟」的標誌（見圖1）或「聖喬治十字架」作為成員身分認同或是嚇人或是躲避警察偵查。<sup>105</sup> 標誌圖中的拉丁字“*In hoc signo vinces*”翻譯成英文是“*In this sign thou shalt conquer*”，中文是「以

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100. English Defence League, “Mission Statement,” January 3, 2016, Accessed, *English Defence League*, <<http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/mission-statement/>>.

101. English Defence League, “EDL A5 Leaflet,” January 2018, Accessed, *English Defence League*, <<http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/A5-leaflet.pdf>>.

102. Nigel Copsey, *The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality*, p. 10.

103. Hilary Pilkington, *Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League*, pp. 37-59.

104. Joel Busher, *The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League*, pp. 45-46; Hilary Pilkington, *Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League*, pp. 60-91.

105. Dominic Alessio & Kristen Meredith, “Blackshirts for the Twenty-First Century? Fascism and the English Defence League,” pp. 104-118.

此徽號，你將得勝」源自西元 312 年米爾維安大橋戰役(Battle of the Milvian Bridge)，羅馬帝國君士坦丁一世(Constantini I)因基督啟示而以此十字架圖案製作盾牌，打敗對方而成為唯一君王及信奉基督教。



圖 1 「英格蘭防衛同盟」的標誌

資料來源：English Defence League, “English Defence League,” October 12, 2019, Accessed, *English Defence League*, <[www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk](http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk)>。

說明：該同盟因違反網路禁止暴力言論規定，已被關閉。

「英格蘭防衛同盟」的運作及活動經費除了接受個人或團體經由網路社群媒體捐款外，主要是由資訊科技投資顧問埃林(Alan Derek Ayling)，化名為雷克(Alan Lake)及地產投資者馬奇尼(Ann Marchini)，化名為蓋亞(Gaia)或迪瓦庫克斯(Dominique Devaux)的幕後捐款，兩人也是該同盟少數教育水準較高的知識份子。<sup>106</sup> 埃林並設有「為自由」

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106. Nigel Copsey, *The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality*, pp. 16-18;

(4 Freedoms)部落格網站，也不時造訪瑞典及挪威或接受電視訪問，發表憂慮英國「伊斯蘭化」的言論，<sup>107</sup>兩人最後都因捐款給「英格蘭防衛同盟」而失去原先的工作，<sup>108</sup>致使「英格蘭防衛同盟」經費日趨減少，影響力日漸衰落。

### 三、「英格蘭防衛同盟」的沒落－羅賓森的離開

由於「英格蘭防衛同盟」成員人數擴張迅速而使內部極端派與溫和派產生衝突，以及缺乏組織承諾的邊緣成員增多，歸屬感與凝聚力減弱，成員不再積極參與活動，集體行動與可能性降低，造成該同盟的沒落。<sup>109</sup>根據學者調查，「英格蘭防衛同盟」的主要支持者集中於男性白人勞工階級、中學教育程度，但不是最可能失業、居住在社會住宅或政治疏離的人，而是對穆斯林或少數族裔有排外主義的人。<sup>110</sup>

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Dipesh Gadhher & Robin Henry, "Unmasked Wealthy Backers Behind Far Right League," *The Sunday Times*, December 11, 2011, <<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/unmasked-wealthy-backers-behind-far-right-league-vfvm73zjxch>>.

107. Jamie Doward, Vicus Burger, & James Burton, "EDL Leader Demanded Debate on Killing David Cameron and Archbishop," *The Guardian*, July 30, 2011, <<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jul/30/alan-lake-english-defence-league>>.

108. Dipesh Gadhher, "Turner Artist Drops Far-Right Aide," *The Sunday Times*, January 15, 2012, <<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turner-artist-drops-far-right-aide-5wzl3t8r95g>>.

109. Joel Busher, *The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League*, pp. 57-62; Elizabeth A. Morrow & John Meadowcroft, "The Rise and Fall of the English Defence League: Self-Governance, Marginal Members and the Far Right," *Political Studies*, Vol. 67, No. 3, August 2019, pp. 539-556.

110. Jon Garland & James Treadwell, "The New Politics of Hate? An Assessment of the Appeal of the English Defence League Amongst Disadvantaged

2011年起，由於意識形態衝突、區域組織競爭、抗議策略歧見、不同足球隊球迷間的敵意，以及領導人之間的個人恩怨而使內部摩擦公開，<sup>111</sup> 尤其重要領導人物的個人爭議及彼此間之衝突。羅賓森是「英格蘭防衛同盟」的成立者，更已經成為有利可圖的國際品牌，<sup>112</sup> 羅賓森本人也說，「我知道，我的名字將永遠與『英格蘭防衛同盟』連結在一起」，<sup>113</sup> 但重要領導人物之間仍是不免有所爭執及衝突。尤其多位領導人（羅賓森、雷、雷克）捲入2011年7月的挪威布雷維克（Anders Behring Breivik。本名漢森，Fjotolf Hansen）屠殺事件，其盟友也紛紛脫離，致使示威遊行規模縮小而街頭對罵及打鬥不斷，並在社群媒體相互攻擊對方。<sup>114</sup>2011年7月，挪威奧斯陸烏托亞(Utoya)島發生大屠殺事件，布雷維克屠殺76位民眾，布雷維克在攻擊之前，就與雷透過網際網路社群媒體連繫，並在殺人文告中提及多次在英國相見，深受雷的影響，<sup>115</sup> 雷遂再度成為新聞關注焦點。2014年更被

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White Working-Class Communities in England,” *Journal of Hate*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 123-141; Goodwin Matthew, David Cutts, & Laurence Janta-Lipinski, “Economic Losers, Protectors, Islamophobes or Xenophobes? Predicting Public Support for a Counter-Jihad Movement,” pp. 4-26.

111. Joel Busher, *The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League*, pp. 123-156.

112. Simon Childs, “The Far-Right International,” *New Internationalist*, March 26, 2019, <<https://newint.org/features/2019/02/11/far-right-international>>.

113. Tommy Robinson, *Enemy of the State* (Barley: The Press News Ltd, 2017), p. 5.

114. Joel Busher, “Why Even Misleading Identity Claims Matter: The Evolution of the English Defence League,” *Political Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 2, May 2018, pp. 323-338.

115. Duncan Gardham & James Orr, “Oslo Attacks: EDL Member Paul Ray Admits He May Have been Anders Breivik’s Inspiration,” *The Telegraph*, July 29, 2011, <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/>

「英格蘭防衛同盟」的埃林控告毀謗，遭馬爾他政府法院判處賠償5千歐元。<sup>116</sup>2013年1月7日，羅賓森曾因持有朋友麥克馬斯特的假護照搭機入境美國，被美國海關查獲而拒絕入境，他再以假名哈瑞斯(Paul Harris)的護照搭機回英國，法官卻判他護照未曾出現的姓名(本名)葉克斯類-萊農(Yaxley-Lennon)10個月徒刑。<sup>117</sup>

2013年5月22日步兵團士兵瑞格比(Lee Rigby)在倫敦市伍利奇(Woolwich)郊區遭兩名奈及利亞裔穆斯林殺害，並將屍體推至馬路上，以抗議英軍殺害穆斯林；引起英國人民激憤，穆斯林領袖也譴責暴行，使「英格蘭防衛同盟」得以藉此再度結合分裂的內部盟友。<sup>118</sup>

反對「英格蘭防衛同盟」的團體則在其示威遊行時，舉出反對種族主義的標語，並大聲呼喊抗議口號，而與示威遊行者爭吵及打鬥；警方為區隔雙方或維持秩序，有時逮捕或拘禁反示威者，而遭致控訴違法拘捕，遂採取庭外賠償金和解，自2013年9月起，已經支付72萬9千英鎊的和解金。<sup>119</sup>2013年10月，羅賓森辭職離開而改由出身「西南英格蘭」(South West England)分部的埃部利特(Tim Ablitt)接任，

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8669670/Oslo-attacks-EDL-member-Paul-Ray-admits-he-may-have-been-Anders-Breiviks-inspiration.html>.

116. Chris Mangion, "Right-winger Defamed as 'Breivik mentor', Awarded 5,000 in Damages," *MaltaToday*, January 28, 2014, <[https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/court\\_and\\_police/36038/right-winger-defamed-as-breivik-mentor-gets-5-000-20140128#.XTZ0LfIzaUI](https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/court_and_police/36038/right-winger-defamed-as-breivik-mentor-gets-5-000-20140128#.XTZ0LfIzaUI)>.

117. "EDL Leader Stephen Lennon Jailed for False Passport Offence," *BBC News*, January 7, 2013, <<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-20935502>>.

118. Joel Busher, "Why Even Misleading Identity Claims Matter: The Evolution of the English Defence League," pp. 323-338.

119. Rob Evans, "Met Police Pay Out £700,000 to Detained Anti-fascist Protesters," *The Guardian*, June 26, 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/26/met-police-in-700k-payout-to-detained-anti-fascist-protesters>>.



並在盧頓成立全國總部。

2013年10月羅賓森退職，擔任以反制極端主義為目的的智庫「奎利亞姆基金會」(Quilliam Foundation)的員工，並宣稱「英格蘭防衛同盟」過於極端，他遂決定離開而加入該基金會。<sup>120</sup>2014年2月，埃部利特稱身體健康問題不適擔任主席，遂指派羅賓森的保鏢、前安全主管及「西米德蘭」(West Midlands)地區協調者的艾迪歐威斯(Steve Eddowes)接任主席至今，但實際掌握權力者仍是羅賓森。<sup>121</sup>但隨著內部對於發展路線與抗議策略的歧異，2015年1月，羅賓森退出「英格蘭防衛同盟」，另組類似德國極右派運動「(德國)歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」(PEGIDA, Germany)的「(英國)歐洲愛國者抵制西方世界伊斯蘭化」(PEGIDA, UK)運動，並且將其19條宣言翻譯成英文版。<sup>122</sup>他並未成功，但民眾仍然是以「英格蘭防衛同盟」前領導者的身分看待他。尤其2018年5月，他因為藐視法庭被判入獄服刑13個月，數以千計的「英格蘭防衛同盟」成員及支持者在倫敦懷特霍爾(Whitehall)大道遊行，主張羅賓森不是極端份子而是自由鬥士，要求「釋放羅賓森」(Free Tommy Robinson)，造成警民衝突受傷。<sup>123</sup>

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120. 此基金會是由巴基斯坦裔納瓦茲(Maajid Usman Nawaz)於2008年成立，他原是積極的國際泛伊斯蘭組織伊札布特(Hizb ut-Tahrir)成員，並接受英國政府資助。

121. Hilary Pilkington, *Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League*, p. 41.

122. Menschen-in-dresden.de, "Positionspapier der Pegida," September 22, 2020, Accessed, *Menschen-in-dresden.de*, <<https://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf>>.

123. Neal Baker & Richard Hendron, "Five Police Officers Injured and Nine Arrests as 'Free Tommoy Robinson' Protesters Clash with Cops at London March," *The Sun*, June 11, 2018, <<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6489748/free-tommy-robinson-protestors-clash-police-london/>>.

2018年3月羅賓森因為違反推特管理仇恨行為的規則，被永久禁止使用推特；<sup>124</sup>即使2019年4月，他與英國獨立黨歐洲議會議員候選人班傑明(Carl Benjamin)的推特帳戶也被暫停使用；<sup>125</sup>臉書(含Instagram)則於2019年2月因羅賓森呼籲以暴力對待穆斯林，重複地違反禁止「有組織的仇恨」(organized hate)的標準，而禁止其留言，並於三月限制「英格蘭防衛同盟」、「英國民族黨」及「英國第一」等極右派團體的留言；<sup>126</sup>Youtube更限制他播放的頻道，包括移除上傳影片及封鎖其直播。<sup>127</sup>甚至亞馬遜(Amazon)也在臉書之後，將羅賓森和邁克勞福林(Peter McLaughlin)合著的書籍《穆斯林為何因伊斯蘭而殺人》(*Why Muslim Kill for Islam*)下架。<sup>128</sup>五月，羅賓森因為在社群媒

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124. Kevin Rawlinson, "Tommy Robinson Permanently Banned by Twitter," *The Guardian*, March 28, 2018, <<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/28/tommy-robinson-permanently-banned-twitter-violating-rules-hateful-conduct>>.

125. Mikey Smith, "Twitter Bans Tommy Robinson Ukip Candidate Carl Benjamin's Campaign," *The Mirror*, April 26, 2019, <<https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/twitter-bans-tommy-robinson-ukip-14729717>>.

126. Alex Hern, "Facebook Bans Far-Right Groups Including BNP, EDL and Britain First," *The Guardian*, April 18, 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/18/facebook-bans-far-right-groups-including-bnp-edl-and-britain-first>>.

127. "YouTube Restrict Tommy Robinson Channel," *BBC News*, April 2, 2019, <[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-47786252?intlink\\_from\\_url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/ce34jq50j5zt/tommy-robinson&link\\_location=live-reporting-story](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-47786252?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/ce34jq50j5zt/tommy-robinson&link_location=live-reporting-story)>.

128. Annabel Murphy, "Off the Shelves Amazon Stop Selling Tommy Robinson's Book on Islam the Day After He Was Booted off Facebook and Instagram but He Still Can Broadcast on YouTube," *The Sun*, February 27, 2019, <<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/8523526/amazon-stop-selling-tommy-robinson-book-islam-day-youtube-broadcast/>>.

體臉書直播訴訟案情而遭到以藐視法院被起訴；七月，英國法院判決罪名成立，判刑九個月；即使他因為藐視法庭入獄，但仍獲得支持者250萬美元政治捐獻及認為是言論自由的政治受害者；<sup>129</sup>羅賓森在接受美國著名的陰謀論「資訊戰爭」(InfoWars)網站訪問時，呼籲美國總統川普給予其及家人政治庇護。<sup>130</sup>

失去在網際網路社群媒體的「發言權」之後，羅賓森的影響力就不復以往了。即使2018年11月起，英國獨立黨(United Kingdom Independence Party)黨魁巴嫩(Gerard Batten)任命羅賓森為政治顧問，引起內部最富聲望的法爾吉(Nigel Farage)退黨反對，並要求召開全國執行委員會對巴嫩進行不信任案表決，巴嫩特別向媒體表示，羅賓森並非極右派人士，但最後還是在該黨全國執行委員會辭去黨魁。<sup>131</sup>2020年6月，羅賓森帶領支持者阻止「黑人生命也是命」(Black Live Matter)遊行者意圖拆除前首相邱吉爾(Winston Churchill)雕像，以「愛國團結」(patriotic unity)「捍衛英國人的紀念碑」(defence our memorials)。<sup>132</sup>

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129. "Tommy Robinson Jailed over Contempt of Court," *BBC News*, July 11, 2019, <<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48950672>>.

130. Shane Croucher, "Prominent British Far-Right Activist Tommy Robinson Begg Donald Trump for Asylum in U.S.: 'I Need Evacuation from This Country,'" *Newsweek*, July 9, 2019, <<https://www.newsweek.com/far-right-tommy-robinson-donald-trump-asylum-us-1448197>>.

131. Peter Walker, "Gerard Batten Quit As UKIP Leader," *The Guardian*, June 3, 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/03/gerard-batten-quits-as-ukip-leader>>.

132. "Campaigners Fear Far-Right 'Defence' of Statues such as Churchill's," *The Guardian*, June 10, 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/10/far-right-protesters-plan-defence-of-statues-such-as-churchills>>.

## 肆、「英格蘭防衛同盟」何去何從

在 2011 年前，英國政府的反恐戰略主要是針對國際恐怖主義，2005-2010 年的工黨政府期間，其內政部 2006 年公布的反恐政策文件是《反制國際恐怖主義：英國的戰略》(*Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy*)、2009 年公布的反恐政策文件是《英國反制國際恐怖主義戰略》(*The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*)，到了 2011 年起，英國政府就將之改為《英國反制恐怖主義戰略》(*The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*)，但仍聚焦於國際恐怖主義對英國國家利益與安全的威脅。但 2018 年的《英國反制恐怖主義戰略》就將極右派與伊斯蘭極端份子皆視為是恐怖主義份子，不管極右派是否是因為伊斯蘭極端份子所致，皆須採取務實的防制措施。<sup>133</sup> 簡言之，極右派已經成為英國國內恐怖主義極端活動的來源之一，是英國政府必須予以防制及預防的恐怖主義活動。英國軍事情報單位(MI5)首長及倫敦警察局長都表示，極右派恐怖主義已經成為英國安全與繁榮的關鍵威脅。<sup>134</sup> 英國政府在面對「英格蘭防衛同盟」的反伊斯蘭及反移民示威抗議活動挑戰時，曾經提出不同的中央及地方政策與措施，地方政治人物大多主張限制及約制其活動規模及範圍。<sup>135</sup> 即使官員警告右派極端主義

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133. The Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, June 2018, *The Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office*, <[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/716907/140618\\_CCS207\\_CCS0218929798-1\\_CONTEST\\_3.0\\_WEB.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf)>.

134. Seth Jacobson, "Far-Right Terrorism Threat Is Growing, Says MI5 and Police Chiefs," *The Guardian*, March 29, 2019, <[https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/29/far-right-terrorism-threat-is-growing-say-mi5-and-police-chiefs?CMP=share\\_btn\\_link](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/29/far-right-terrorism-threat-is-growing-say-mi5-and-police-chiefs?CMP=share_btn_link)>.

135. William Edward Charles Allchorn, *Anti-Islamic Protest in the UK: Policy*

和其所反對的伊斯蘭極端份子是一樣凶惡的(murderous)，但採取的反制措施卻相當有限。<sup>136</sup> 唐斯(William M. Downs)認為英國政府及政治人物當初「放手」(clean hands)或漠視極右派威脅，沒有採取因應作為(do nothing)，造成極右派迅速興起。<sup>137</sup>

有學者認為對照於義大利墨索里尼的「黑衫軍」(Squadristi)，「英格蘭防衛同盟」不再只是反伊斯蘭主義，而是基於「再生的極端民族主義」(palingenetic ultranationalism)意識形態的法西斯組織；<sup>138</sup> 探究其意識形態及論述更不是其自稱的「反種族主義」的人權團體而是「反伊斯蘭主義」的文化種族主義團體，藉由對立「英國」(British)人民與穆斯林人民以保護前者傳統的族裔文化優勢；<sup>139</sup> 也不是其所稱反伊斯蘭的「單一議題抗議團體」(single-issue-protest-group)。<sup>140</sup> 由於「英格蘭防衛同盟」極端反伊斯蘭的言論引發穆斯林極端份子多次企圖暗殺攻擊羅賓森，以及在遊行中進行恐怖攻擊。<sup>141</sup> 尤其2017年3月22日，

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*Responses to the Far Right* (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 8-12.

136. Hilary Aked, Melissa Jones, & David Miller, *Islamophobia in Europe: How Governments Are Enabling the Far-Right 'Counter-Jihad' Movement*, (Bristol: Public Interest Investigation, 2019), pp. 25-28.

137. William M. Downs, "How Effective is the Cordon Sanitaire? Lessons from Efforts to Contain the Far-right in Belgium, France, Denmark, and Norway," *Journal of Conflict and Violence Research*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, pp. 35-36.

138. Dominic Alessio & Kristen Meredith, "Blackshirts for the Twenty-First Century? Fascism and the English Defence League," pp. 104-118.

139. George Kassimeris & Leonie Jackson, "The Ideology and Discourse of the English Defence League: 'Not Racist, Not Violent, Just No Longer Silent,'" *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 1, February 2015, pp. 171-188.

140. Joel Busher, "Why Even Misleading Identity Claims Matter: The Evolution of the English Defence League," pp. 323-338.

141. Mark White, "EDL Terror Attack Plot : Six Men Plead Guilty," *Sky News*,

倫敦西敏橋發生由一位出生於英國的穆斯林瑪斯烏德(Khalid Masood)蓄意開車撞死及持刀殺死路人的恐怖攻擊事件，羅賓森親赴現場，發言指控伊斯蘭極端主義及英國政府要為此負責，國內已處於戰爭狀態；但遭致批評這只會使事情惡化。<sup>142</sup> 接連著，五月曼徹斯特遭致伊斯蘭恐怖份子炸彈攻擊，死傷數十多人，並揚言接續六月要攻擊利物浦；為此，「英格蘭防衛同盟」要進行抗議示威遊行，但當地政府與人民擔心事件擴大而拒絕。<sup>143</sup> 六月，在倫敦橋、波羅市場(Borough Market)及沃克斯豪爾(Vauxhall)發生三位出生於摩洛哥及巴基斯坦的穆斯林駕車撞人後持刀行兇殺人，伊斯蘭國(ISIS)宣稱是其所為。<sup>144</sup>

英國也存在著「反英格蘭防衛同盟」的團體，例如「團結反對法西斯主義」(United Against Fascism)、「希望非仇恨」(Hope Not Hate)、「起來反抗種族主義」(Stand Up To Racism)及「告訴測量反穆斯林攻擊(告訴媽媽)」(Tell Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks, Tell MAMA)監督及反制其示威活動，以及團結相關組織及教育民眾對抗「英格蘭防衛同盟」。某種程度上，這些組織制衡了「英格蘭防衛同

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April 30, 2013, <<https://news.sky.com/story/edl-terror-attack-plot-six-men-plead-guilty-10447178>>.

142. “Former EDL Leader Tommy Robinson Arrives at Scene of London Terror Attack,” *The Telegraph*, March 22, 2017, <[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/22/former-edl-leader-tommy-robinson-arrives-scene-london-terror/?WT.mc\\_id=tmg\\_share\\_em](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/22/former-edl-leader-tommy-robinson-arrives-scene-london-terror/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_em)>.

143. Rachael Revese, “Manchester Bombing: Macunians Shut Down EDL Rally after Terror Attack,” *The Independent*, May 23, 2017, <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/manchester-bombing-edl-rally-terror-attack-protest-shut-down-a7752201.html>>.

144. Helen Thomas, “What Happened in the London Bridge Attack, Who Were the Borough Market Attackers and How Many Victims Were There?” *The Sun*, July 5, 2017, <<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3720295/london-bridge-terror-attack-inquest-victims-what-happened/>>.

盟」的極端意識形態及擴張，以及增加雙方暴力衝突的場合。這也使得英國政府反制極端主義計畫所需人力年年上漲，2018年英國政府反制極端主義計畫的36%人力用在防止極右派示威活動的暴力衝突，用在防止伊斯蘭極端主義則是44%，也是首次在提供專業支援給受到極端主義威脅的個人保護上，兩者增加人力的比率相差不遠，前者44%及後者45%。<sup>145</sup>簡言之，就是迫使將反恐活動資源必須運用於國內極端主義活動，又因反伊斯蘭的極右派活動造成國內穆斯林與國際穆斯林恐怖份子結合，增加英國政府反恐的壓力及資源支出。英國大倫敦市警察局副局長就表示，因為由英國國內出生的恐怖主義份子發動的攻擊活動日增，國內社會議題是造成這些恐怖攻擊活動的主因，英國警力與安全人員已經不足以應付；極端右派恐怖份子因為民族主義而興起，脫歐公投將促使其升高暴力，伊斯蘭極端恐怖份子和極端右派恐怖份子都在增加招募英國出生的民眾進行恐怖攻擊事件。<sup>146</sup>

簡言之，即使「英格蘭防衛同盟」的勢力不復以往，英國內部的反伊斯蘭及反移民情緒仍會是培育或促進極右派民粹主義的基礎條件，極右派民粹主義促進了極右派恐怖主義的蔓延，也就是說仍然會有另一個或許多個「英格蘭防衛同盟」不斷重現在英國與歐洲，不時挑戰歐洲的民主政治價值與秩序。即使英國脫離歐盟之後，「英格蘭防衛同盟」官方臉書及網路廣播仍強調揭露伊斯蘭邪惡，「永不投降」(No Surrender Ever!)。

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145. Jamie Grierson, "Prevent Referrals Over Rightwing Extremism Rise by Over a Third," *The Guardian*, December 13, 2018, <[https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/13/prevent-referrals-over-rightwing-extremism-rise-by-over-a-third?CMP=share\\_btn\\_link](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/13/prevent-referrals-over-rightwing-extremism-rise-by-over-a-third?CMP=share_btn_link)>.

146. Vikran Dodd, "Counter-terror Chief Says Policing Alone Cannot Beat Terrorism," *The Guardian*, August 6, 2019, <[https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/06/counter-terrorism-chief-calls-for-greater-social-inclusion?CMP=share\\_btn\\_link](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/06/counter-terrorism-chief-calls-for-greater-social-inclusion?CMP=share_btn_link)>.

《2019年歐盟恐怖主義狀況與趨勢報告》(*European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019*)就指出雖然不及伊斯蘭聖戰士，但極左派與極右派恐怖主義對歐洲安全秩序的威脅日增，各國右派暴力活動場合各有不同。<sup>147</sup> 甚至在美國，極右派恐怖攻擊事件及被逮捕的極右派恐怖份子也逐年增加。<sup>148</sup> 極右派民粹主義已經是歐美國家政府必須審慎政治或政策因應的國家安全議題，以確保民主政治的穩定與秩序。然而，歐洲右派極端主義的反伊斯蘭活動，常是該國政府移民與反極端主義政策所造成的。<sup>149</sup> 無論如何，因應極端的、暴力的、恐怖的民粹主義所帶來的威脅，已經成為數位科技時代國家與社會維持人民主權與民主政治的首要職責之一。

## 伍、結論

學者認為相對剝奪感的經驗與認知、政治疏離，以及文化迷失方向，促使當前歐洲極端右派民粹主義興起。<sup>150</sup> 而且民粹人士、極右派人士及反體制人士並不相信主流媒體，因為主流媒體會過濾不符合

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147. Europol, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019*(TE-SAT), June 27, 2019, Europol, <<https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat>>.

148. Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States," *CSIS Briefs*, November 2018, <[https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181119\\_RightWingTerrorism\\_layout\\_FINAL.pdf?MyC9DjLLRftoeUKvq6qxFPsCPFoTkBpH](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181119_RightWingTerrorism_layout_FINAL.pdf?MyC9DjLLRftoeUKvq6qxFPsCPFoTkBpH)>.

149. Hilary Aked, Melissa Jones, & David Miller, *Islamophobia in Europe: How Governments Are Enabling the Far-Right 'Counter-Jihad' Movement*, pp. 5-7.

150. Dieter Rucht, "Right-Wing Populism in Context: A Historical and Systematic Perspective," in Gregor Fitzi, Jurgen Mackert, & Bryan S. Turner, eds., *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy Vol. 2, Politics, Social Movement and Extremism* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 78-82.



「政治正確」(politically correct)的訊息，遂偏好網際網路及社群媒體傳播訊息。<sup>151</sup> 藉由網際網路及社群媒體宣傳及動員民眾，反移民、右派極端主義及民粹主義已經展現激進化的過程，邁向使用暴力的恐怖主義。<sup>152</sup> 甚至造成（極）右派民粹主義內部的激進與溫和路線爭議，例如羅賓森離開「英格蘭防衛同盟」的原因之一，就是他認為「英格蘭防衛同盟」越來越暴力。這似乎有些諷刺，羅賓森原本被認為是暴力份子及極端主義份子，現在反而成為溫和派，可見極右派民粹主義運動趨向激進暴力，極易牽連歐洲民主政治秩序。

因此，歐洲（英國）政府應將恐怖主義與極端主義皆視為國家安全的威脅，不應只聚焦於國際恐怖主義而忽略國內極端主義，兩者會相互影響及連動，尤其是帶有反伊斯蘭教意識形態的極端主義。政府應務求安內攘外，以確保國內極端主義不致破壞國內政治秩序，造成內部對立衝突。

歐洲國家的移民政策已經面臨國內（極）右派勢力嚴厲的挑戰，尤其 2010 年「阿拉伯之春」後，中東、非洲和南亞等地非法難民經地中海及巴爾幹半島進入歐盟國家，造成歐盟各國之間與內部的立場分歧與政策爭議，甚至要關閉邊境阻擋難民湧入。例如瑞典與德國增加接納移民人數，但德國執政聯盟內部分歧，國會及地方選舉失利，梅克爾總理宣布不再競選連任。各國內部的民族主義或極右派民粹主義人士反對接納移民，不時示威抗議遊行，造成國內社會動盪不安。歐盟應該務實檢討移民政策與文化政策，因為國內政治社會穩定與繁榮

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151. Andre Haller & Kristoffer Holt, "Paradoxical Populism: How PEGIDA Relates to Mainstream and Alternative Media," *Information, Communication and Society*, March 14, 2018, <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1449882>>.

152. Daniel Koehler, "Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future," *Prism*, Vol. 6, No. 2, July 2016, pp. 85-104.

是歐盟各國存在的前提，目前歐盟多數國家拒絕接納非法難民也就顯示出實際的問題，數位民粹主義仍是影響歐盟國家及歐洲秩序的關鍵力量之一。

數位民粹主義是運用數位科技傳播極端主義思想，動員群眾及進行抗議活動，甚至破壞國內穩定秩序。但在言論自由及表意自由的民主憲政基礎上，只要其言論及行為不違法，就獲得國家法律保障與保護，唯有透過公民社會輿論約制、數位公民素養及民主選舉機制，數位民粹主義才終有沒落之時。數位公民社會即在對應數位民粹主義的傳播，數位公民素養是要使公民不會受到民粹主義者運用數位科技傳遞仇恨、歧視、暴力等等的意識形態動員影響。只要民主社會有公民團體出來抗拒及抵制民粹主義，民粹主義運動就會沒落，英格蘭防禦同盟就是例子。然而只要民主政治存在，民粹主義就不會永久消滅，因為始終有領導者會以各種方式宣傳及動員群眾，意圖獲取權力或是實踐其自認的「社會正義」理想。但健全的民主政治是包容、吸納各種對民主政治體制本身及運作的失望與不滿，使人民得以表達其意見及影響政策，減緩或消除人民的失望與不滿，避免民粹主義極端化、暴力化與恐怖化，以展現人民主權善的一面。

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## **The Radicalization of Digital Populism and Its Potential Threats to Democracy: A Case of English Defence League**

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### **Abstract**

Digital populists, or cyber-populists, have used digital technologies, or information and communication technologies, as communicating and mobilizing tools of political participation for politicians and the public to resort to direct democracy and to lead people away from representative democracy. Digital populists intend to override or destroy the established democratic constitutionalism through extremism or discrimination. This paper reviews the literature of populism to explore the characteristics and operations of digital populism by analyzing the British populist organization, the English Defence League, a far-right anti-Islamic organization that has used social media to pressure the European countries' counter-terrorism and immigration policies by violence. In particular, far-right parties have acquired a considerable number of seats in national parliaments and the European Parliament, and they are a potential threat to the democratic countries of the European Union and democracy.

**Keywords:** Digital Politics, Digital Populism, Cyber Populism, Digital Citizenship, English Defence League