ECFA’s Effects on the Interplay between Taiwan’s Political Parties (NEWSLETTER NO. 9)
English key-word:
ECFA’s Effects on the Interplay between Taiwan’s Political Parties
specialist:
Researcher:
Wu-ueh Chang
Report type:
publish date:
201007
Chinese abstract:
While President Ma Ying-jeou’s has served
half of his first presidential term since he took
office on May 20, 2008, cross-strait relations have
improved from what Beijing called a severe
historical period with daunting risks to a peaceful
development stage with immense opportunities.
This development is best epitomized by
negotiations between the two duly authorized
organizations of the two sides -- Taiwan’s Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(ARATS). Four rounds of talks were held between
SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung and ARATS
Chairman Chen Yunlin. The four Chiang-Chen
talks yielded 12 agreements on subjects including
chartered flights, tourism, air transport, marine
freight, mail, judicial cooperation, food safety,
agricultural quarantine and inspection,
measurements and standards, and fishing labor
cooperation, and one general consensus on
Chinese capital into Taiwan. At the upcoming fifth
round of Chiang-Chen talks, to be held in China,
the two sides are expected to sign the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This
agreement and its implementation will mark a new
milestone in cross-strait relations, moving from
one-way to two-way flows, from indirect to direct
exchanges and from partial to full-scale interplay.
When in full force, this agreement will facilitate
normal interflows of human resources, goods and
capital between the two sides, contributing to
cross-strait peace and development in the long
run.
How will the signing of the ECFA affect the
interplay between Taiwan’s major political parties
and between Taiwan and Mainland China?
Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), has opposed the ECFA
and attempted to deter its signing through
parliamentary reviews and a referendum. The
DPP is also trying to make local mayoral elections
later this year a vote of confidence in opposing the
agreement. In this author’s opinion, these
strategies might fall short of any DPP expectations.
The ECFA primarily affects cross-strait relations
in terms of economic, cultural and educational
flows. There is little chance that it will be used to
embark on future political talks or touch on other
sensitive issues, such as military confidence
building mechanisms between the two sides.
In terms of domestic politics, the DPP controls less than one-third of seats in the
Legislative Yuan (LY). The extended LY sessions,
convened for the review of the ECFA, will last no
more than one month, a period too short to build
up and constitute an effective boycott.
The DPP’s other strategy is to solicit enough
endorsements for a referendum to overturn the
ECFA. But no country in the world has held a
referendum on a free trade agreement (FTA),
which is between countries with diplomatic ties
and serves similar purposes like the ECFA. The
only exception is Costa Rica, which held a
referendum on its FTA with the United States after
its parliament vetoed it. This cannot be likened to
Taiwan’s situations today. In Taiwan, technically
speaking, it would be very difficult for a
referendum to succeed, since it is legally valid only
when half of Taiwan citizens (or roughly 18.5
million in real numbers) approve it. Two
referendums voted concurrently with presidential
elections in 2004 and 2008 were unsuccessful due
to the insufficient number of voters. Today, in
Taiwan’s general public opinions, those in favor of
the ECFA still outnumber those against it.
Furthermore, there is a slim possibility of having a
valid referendum on the ECFA before 2012.
Despite this, the DPP has prolonged the opposition
against ECFA as a conductor stick to direct and
mobilize its supporters against the ruling party
and woo some independents.
I do not believe that the results of local
mayoral elections later this year can be considered
a test to the general public’s pros or cons of the
ECFA. One reason is that the ECFA’s “early
harvest” list will not take effect until next year.
Results of local mayoral elections later this year
will pave the way for the government to promote
how the ECFA can benefit cross-strait economic
development. The next presidential election, held
in March 2012, will be the actual test of ECFA
acceptance among the general public and a
confidence vote on Ma’s first four-year term.
In terms of cross-strait relations, the ECFA
will serve as a framework for future closer
economic cooperation between the two sides. How
ECFA helps the cross-strait economic ties to
progress will depend on the mutual political trust
between Taipei and Beijing and economic
reciprocity between the two economies. As
Taiwan’s presidential election in 2012 draws closer,
it deserves close observation whether Beijing
might make greater economic concessions in
expectation of a certain political outcome.
I believe that political differences over the
two sides’ positioning still persist, and political
issues are still pending without a clear resolution
in sight. Furthermore, Taiwan’s domestic political
divide has widened due to the ECFA. At a time
when the economic gains subsequent to the ECFA
have yet to emerge and the two sides of the Taiwan
Straits are not ready for negotiating political
agenda. Under rash for political negotiations at
this stage might jeopardize the current cross-strait
development and further widen the political divide
within Taiwan. When the ECFA is in force,
cross-strait economic relations will continue to
expand and issues such as protection of intellectual
property rights and investment will become the
main subject across the negotiation table for
future cross-strait interplay. Further development
of cultural, educational, news gathering, and social
relations may be negotiated. Beijing has a deep
understanding that its Taiwan policy objectives
will be best served through economic, cultural and social conduits. A blunt dash toward political goals
will hardly be welcome or may even backfire.
In the next two years, Ma and his
administration will be judged by two yardsticks in
its external relations: whether Ma can maintain a
stable cross-strait political situation and keep
expanding cross-strait relations under the ECFA,
and whether Taiwan can sign any FTAs with
major trading partners. He will also be measured
by four domestic yardsticks -- whether Taiwan’s
GDP is growing; whether the unemployment rates
are dropping; whether the general public is
satisfied with Ma’s efforts on addressing the gap
between the riches and the poor; and whether
wealth distribution improves. These four
socio-economic yardsticks will serve to gauge the
general public’s support of the development of
cross-strait relations in the post-ECFA era.
(Dr. Wu-ueh Chang is the current dean of the
Graduate Institute of China Studies at Tamkang
University)
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